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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the meaning and reach of autonomy. More
particularly, it analyzes the means by which personal autonomy
boundaries are established and, relatedly, the notion of crossing an
autonomy boundary, which gives rise to an autonomy invasion.
Plausible autonomy boundaries between persons are looked at
mainly from an individualistic, deontic viewpoint. I take the per-
spective of persons making personal claims against one another,
typically in light of existing legal, moral, and social norms. The au-
tonomy claims of entities other than individuals, such as collectives
(e.g., the state, corporations), are set aside because they are not nat-
ural persons with independent moral status.'
The currently preponderant strain of legal analysis generally
embraces an internal point of view. The dominant internal orienta-
tion of modern tort scholarship is especially noteworthy. Tort
* For helpful guidance and discussion, the author wishes to thank Miriam Baer,
Anita Bernstein, Mike Cahill, Stacy Caplow, Beryl Jones-Woodin, Adam Kolber,
Susan Kuklin, Brian Lee, Irina Manta, Chris Serkin, Larry Solan, and Nelson Tebbe.
Sam Murumba was particularly helpful with comments. For research assistance, I
thank Evan H. Fox and, especially, Leon Calleja.
I See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 37 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of
Contract Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687,
696 n. 20 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
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scholars who base their theories on corrective justice, such as Ernest
Weinrib, Jules Coleman, and Arthur Ripstein, identify and mainly
support the corrective justice principles that they see as immanent
in existing tort doctrine, and typically reject inconsistent tort doc-
trine or principles as incoherent. 2 Tort scholars with an economic
orientation who look to the Hand formula as signaling the central
organizing principle of tort law negligence, such as Richard Posner,
suggest that the formula implies that the goal of efficiency is recog-
nized as immanent in existing tort law, and commonly dismiss in-
consistent authority as counterproductive. 3 Criminal law and con-
tracts scholars, other than those with a strong law and economics
commitment, do not seem to emphasize a single, identified imma-
nent principle of their legal subjects as much as do most torts schol-
ars.4 They often acknowledge the existence or acceptability of poly-
centric values.5
2 Weinrib, the leader of this orientation, in focusing on "the relationship between
the characteristic aspects of tort law," adopts "an intrinsic ordering, in which each
aspect contributes to the coherence of the whole." Ernest Weinrib, Introduction, in
TORT LAW xi, xiii (Ernest Weinrib ed., 1991). See Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Per-
sonality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 107,
110 (2001) [hereinafter Weinrib, Correlativity] (embracing "justifications internal to
tort law"); JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE xiv-xv (2001) (criticizing
economic analysis as an account of the scheme of practical inference that is reflected
in the relationship among ["concepts central to tort law"]). For criticism of the correc-
tive justice tort theorists' view of what is immanent in tort law, see Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003). Contrary to the
contention of Goldberg and Zipursky that tort law is better explained by their theory
of "civil recourse" than by corrective justice, Gardner tellingly argues that they can-
not properly keep corrective justice out of their tort picture. See John Gardner, Torts
and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43 (2011). Finally, for the claim that "the con-
cept of corrective justice is neither capable of unifying tort law nor of demarcating it
from other legal branches," see Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22
LAW & PHIL. 21, 21 (2003) [hereinafter Sheinman, Tort Law].
3 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 371 (1990); Rich-
ard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). The recent Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts takes the same approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (Negligence) (2011).
4 There are exceptions. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk,
and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 96 (Gerald J. Postema
ed., 2001); Jules L. Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings and Misalignments, 121 YALE
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In contrast to this current strain of legal thought, my approach
looks outside existing law to the overarching principles of individ-
ual rights however they may align with today's law. These princi-
ples stem from Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. This inspi-
ration from Kant reflects the predominant thinking of modern legal,
moral, and political commentators. Writers as diverse as John Rawls
and Robert Nozick ground their fundamental conceptions on Kant's
works. In seeking a rounded understanding of personal autonomy,
reliance on the lessons of existing law is of limited usefulness. There
is little reason to believe that the body of private common law
would reflect a coherence that is ascribed to it by some commenta-
tors. It is still largely influenced by the old writ system. This system
emerged as a means to obtain the jurisdiction of the courts of the
English sovereign. As some commentators have made so clear, it
was not designed for, nor did it ever achieve, a comprehensive, log-
L.J. 541, 548 (2012) (" [T]ort law.., is independent of any particular theory ... , aim
or goal.").
5"Pluralist [contract] theories attempt to respond to the difficulty that unitary
normative theories ["such as autonomy or efficiency"] pose by urging courts to pur-
sue efficiency, fairness, good faith, and the protection of individual autonomy." Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 543 (2003) (footnoting citations to "a broad discussion of this problem"). See,
e.g., Friedrich Kratochwil, The Limits of Contract, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 465, 469 (1994). But
see, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981), Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contracts, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
To briefly speculate, criminal law may be drawn to deterrence - a utilitarian, con-
sequentialist principle - for various reasons. For some egregious crimes, such as
murder and rape, adequate compensation is typically beyond reach. For some other
crimes, such as tax, draft, or jury-duty evasion, or securities fraud, particular harmed
persons may not be identifiable. For some other crimes, such as environmental deg-
radation, harmed individuals may not be entitled, or be sufficiently incented, to
bring a private claim in tort. Since these types of crimes are not adequately requitable
by private parties, more can be said for attempting to deter them altogether. On the
other hand, the key reasons may be criminal law's historical roots. The Sovereign
was eager to avoid disruptions of her realm by securing peace among her subjects.
The subjects demanded this also. As for contract law, deontic promisekeeping, reli-
ance, and expectation maxims are surely on the surface, but so also is the reality that
contracts largely involve commerce. Commerce is promoted by efficiency. This calls
for explicit attention.
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ical ordering of the private law.6 The common law is complete in
the sense that every issue brought before the courts can be resolved
one way or another. But in light of its quirky and historically con-
tingent origins, it would be amazing if the substantive principles
and doctrines of the common law entirely harmonized. 7 At best, the
common law would take a very long time to evolve towards and
achieve harmony because of the braking constraints of the doctrine
of stare decisis and the ebb and flow of the moral and political in-
clinations of the law's agents. Even with an overall trend towards
coherence in the common law, which I do not deny, path depend-
ence would point toward a limited orbit of likely end points short of
a radical reorientation of the common law process. Akin to Pareto
optimality, the common law could reach a state of completeness
and coherence without satisfying any ideal body of substantive
principles. One should be very doubtful about finding a fully justi-
fiable moral "ought" in the "is" of the common law.
A somewhat comparable tale can be told about the origins and
development of criminal law doctrine.8 Here, however, we should
6 See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW (2006) [hereinafter
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS]. Gordley makes a powerful case for the haphazard inco-
herence of modern private law owing to its quirky historical development. What is
of central importance to rational private law development, he and others point out, is
to attend to "what ultimately matters," that is, "the interests we wish to protect." Id.
at 173. "The law did not begin with a theory [of tort law]. It has never worked one
out." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 63 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
See ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 299-300 (2007); Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theo-
ry and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2604 (1995); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in
Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 665, 665-66 (1985).
7 To pick an example, consider the tort doctrine of defamation, much of "which
makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer ever
has had a kind word .... The explanation is in part one of historical accident and
survival, in part one of the conflict of opposing ideas of policy .... W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
1 "It would clearly be absurd to try to explain any existing penal system, whose
historical development reflects an unsystematic diversity of competing influences, in
terms of some unitary set of coherent values and purposes .... R. A. DUFF, TRIALS
AND PUNISHMENTS 5 (1986). "[l]t may be that we face an irreducible conflict of val-
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expect greater, though perhaps not complete, order. The body of
criminal law has historically been subject to comprehensive adjust-
ments through legislation. Subject to constitutional limitations, the
legislative process allows for giant steps, backwards and forwards,
and the opening of entirely new avenues, such as those needed to
cope with abuses relating to the emerging forms of power being
generated by the computer revolution. None of these cautions re-
garding the origin and growth of the law goes to reject the claim
that conceptions of corrective justice and retribution are, at least
partially, immanent in the private and criminal law.9 Bypassing the
powerful arguments by legal economists and other commentators
that additional principles are, and should be, immanent in the law,
the problem remains that corrective justice and retribution are for-
mal concepts only. They instruct us on limitations to what we may
properly do, but they do not tell us exactly what we should do.
The central orientation of my search for the meaning of autono-
my is Kantian, with needed and enlightening help from Aristotle. In
considering the range of an individual's plausible deontic claims, I
will identify points at which normative choices may or must be
made when adopting substantive principles and, when they are
violated, requital principles for the autonomy invasions. Atop a
strictly formal, Kantian foundation, just law allows for a considera-
bly broader range of acceptable doctrine and precepts than is gen-
erally acknowledged. Under this orientation, political obligation
(the duty to obey the law) must be grounded on individualistic
principles alone, such as consent. For instance, to the claim for re-
quital since "you broke the law," the claimee may properly re-
spond, "but I am not obligated to obey that particular law. I did not
consent to it." Although Kant insisted that one has a moral duty to
obey universalized laws, his position involves a nonconsensual so-
ues, which make irreconcilably conflicting demands on our attempts to envisage and
develop more adequate legal institutions." Id. at 6.
9 "[T]ort doctrine is deontological in its structure." Arthur Ripstein, The Divzsion of
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1820 (2004) (footnote
omitted).
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cial contract imposed by the state.10 For purposes of the strongly
individualistic analysis here, a nonconsensual grounding for a so-
cial contract is deemed inadequate.1
Here is a roadmap of what follows. In the private sphere primar-
ily addressed, autonomy boundaries, within which is one's auton-
omy space, are established by each person's adopted deontic max-
ims (e.g., "do not batter another person"). Under the common, for-
mal interpretation of the categorical imperative, 12 an individual's
chosen, substantive, first-order maxims may vary from person to
person. Each individual's set of maxims must be complete, in that it
addresses all possible conflicts with the interests of other persons,
for otherwise the autonomy boundaries are not fully drawn and
thereby leave gaps. Each set of maxims must also be coherent, that
is, all the maxims in the set must be consistent with one another.3
In adopting maxims to establish autonomy boundaries, two sorts of
freedoms are balanced and delineated: first, the liberty to choose
and act;14 and second, the security, essentially, from being acted
10 Kant develops the "idea of the original contract" which is nonconsensual. See
JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 71 n.22 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 198-204 (2001) [hereinafter RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM].
" While remaining a Kantian, I am not alone in departing from some of Kant's
reasoning and plausible implications. "Few, if any, philosophers who work in a
Kantian tradition today accept all of Kant's doctrines, and among them there is a
considerable diversity in both their interpretations of Kant and their preferred ways
of developing Kantian theory." THOMAS E. HILL, JR., RESPECT, PLURALISM, AND
JUSTICE 1, 1 (2000).
12 See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 89-90 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952) (1st
ed. 1821); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40 (1970) [hereinafter
MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT] ("[Tlhe Categorical Imperative is itself no more
a source of maxims or purposes than a judge is a source of litigation.").
13 In principle, every agent could choose the same set of maxims. A totalitarian re-
gime may aim for this. So might a heavenly one.
14 "Freedom is valuable for at least two different reasons. First, more freedom
gives us more opportunity to pursue our objectives - those things that we value ....
Second, we may attach importance to the process of choice itself." AMARTYA SEN, THE
IDEA OF JUSTICE 228 (2009) [hereinafter SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE]. See AMARTYA SEN,
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 10 (2002) [hereinafter SEN, RATIONALITY]; AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 17 (1999) [hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM].
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upon by others. Once a person's autonomy space is plotted, she
may adjust its boundaries by consent, within limits (e.g., no slavery
contracts), by granting another party rights and, correlatively, as-
suming duties. When an autonomy boundary has been impermissi-
bly crossed, that is, there has been an autonomy invasion producing
a wrongful harm (e.g., a battery), requital is available to the in-
vadee. This response requires the invocation of adopted, requital,
second-order maxims. In the private law the requital standards are
conceptions of corrective justice,15 while in the public (criminal)
law, they are conceptions of retribution or distributive justice. For
the violation of a first-order maxim against battery, for instance, an
invadee may seek damages under a second-order requital maxim
based on corrective justice. Because independent claims of the state
are here discounted, conceptions of corrective justice and retribu-
tion focus entirely on individual rights and duties.
The conceptions of corrective justice that are adopted, like the
substantive maxims that initially mark autonomy boundaries, are
matters of individual choice that, again, must simply meet the cate-
gorical imperative and establish a complete and coherent set of re-
quitals to cover all the possible invasions of autonomy space deter-
mined directly by substantive maxims. For example, there could be
one or more remedial conceptions of corrective justice to deal with
harmful ultrahazardous activities, and other ones to deal with neg-
ligence, as where distinct degrees of wrongful risk are accounted
for. Furthermore, the conceptions may vary according to the differ-
ences in the ensuing harms, such as physical versus psychic harms.
The combination of first- and second-order maxims establishes a
person's overall autonomy space. Because these maxims are matters
of personal choice, the maxims adopted by different individuals
may conflict. A claimant may charge another person with invading
her autonomy space by violating one of her first-order maxims. The
11 "From the perspective of corrective justice, the point of a tort action is to undo
the injustice that the defendant has done to the plaintiff." Weinrib, Correlativity, supra
note 2, at 108. For the role of corrective justice in contract theory, see, e.g., Peter Ben-
son, The Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Per-
due, 1 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, art. 5 (2001).
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claimee may properly respond that he has not adopted this particu-
lar maxim and that his conduct fully meets the full set of maxims
consistent with the categorical imperative that he has personally
adopted. Consequently, as a practical matter, the state cannot be
entirely excluded from choosing maxims and imposing them on
individuals. The state must act as an arbiter of inconsistent sets of
maxims as a second-best solution to an otherwise intractable prob-
lem. Similarly, for retribution the state must be the arbiter of con-
flicting claims and the implementer of apt punishment. But this se-
cond-best solution is resorted to only when unavoidable, for it runs
contrary to strict individualistic principles.
In unpacking common conceptions of corrective justice and ret-
ribution, there are three key notions that are often, if not always,
elements: harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. 16 For exam-
ple, "when one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy
conduct, she is to compensate that person to the extent of the
wrongful harm." As in this conception of corrective justice, one or
more of the key notions may relate to whether requital is called for
and, if met, affect the measure of that requital. Furthermore, specifi-
cation of the notions may vary from context to context, as where,
say, a greater degree or type of blameworthiness is required to re-
cover for purely psychic harms than for purely physical harms.
Harms are, in short, of four kinds: physical, economic, psychic, and
dignitary. This last kind of harm, dignitary, has not received exten-
sive attention in existing law, though dignity is central to Kant's
development of practical reason. 17 It does receive much attention
here. Wrongfulness, or wrongful harm, occurs when a substantive,
16 More generally, "corrective justice is itself a contested concept, loose enough to
invite continual debate, valuable enough to be worth fighting over, and compre-
hended enough to produce some shared agreement on its content." Christopher H.
Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liabihty for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143, 146
(1990). See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 197 (2000).
17 "In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity .... [Wlhat...
is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity."
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 41, 84 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1785).
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first-order maxim is violated, as, say, when an agent purposely puts
another person at an unreasonable risk of harm. Blameworthiness
refers to two notions. First, it refers to the extent to which an actor is
responsible for the conduct in question. This responsibility turns on
her relative freedom from ignorance and coercion when choosing
the act or omission. The more she knows about the potential conse-
quences of her considered conduct, the freer she is to make an un-
encumbered choice, the more she is responsible and blameworthy
for the wrongful harms that ensue. Second, blameworthiness refers
to the actor's mental state and conduct regarding the invadee. This
blameworthiness is gauged by the degree of her disrespectfulness
of the invadee's dignity. Fellow moral agents are entitled to equal
respect. Depending on the particular adopted maxims, both forms
of blameworthiness may affect the delineation of autonomy space.
Once an agent has worked out a deontically acceptable range of
meanings for the three key moral notions, she is ready to consider
and adopt a full set of first- and second-order maxims. This article
aims to help her get to that point of being ready to work out her
own autonomy boundaries. I leave it to future articles to help her
further along. The bottom line, it will be seen, is that the deontic
constraints on delineating autonomy boundaries are much looser
than is commonly supposed. A very wide range of potential rights
and duties are consistent with the claims of individualism.
II. DEONTIC FOUNDATIONS
Deontic notions of autonomy are associated with Kant's analysis
of practical reason,18 which leads to his categorical imperative. The
gist of Kant's reasoning, for our purposes, has two prongs: first, a
person, by virtue of her rationality capabilities,19 is an ethical, au-
18 Autonomy is ... the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational
nature." Id. at 85. See SUSAN M. SHELL, KANT AND THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY 2 (2009)
("One could say that Kant put individual 'autonomy' on the map.").
19 See ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 199 (1999) [hereinafter WOOD,
KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT] ("Kant rejects the traditional definition of the human
being as animal rationale, allowing only that the human being is an animal rationabilis
- that is, a being capable of acting rationally but not a being that necessarily or even
20151
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tonomous being entitled to have her dignity respected by others;
20
and second, a person, as an ethical being, also has the duty to re-
spect the autonomy, the dignity, of other moral agents. 21 Kant iden-
tified various forms of the categorical imperative, all of which he
declared to be equivalent.
In contrast to the original formulation of the categorical im-
perative, "Act only in accord with those maxims through which
you can at the same time will that they should be a universal
law", which can be called the Formula of Universal Law,
[Kant's] more "intuitive" formulations are the Formula of
Humanity as an End in Itself, "So act that you always at the
same time use humanity in your own person as well as in the per-
son of every other as an end, never merely as a means", and the
Formula of the Realm of Ends ... which requires "that the
will be able to regard itself as through its maxims at the same time
typically exercises this capacity successfully."). See also MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 12, at 29; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., The Kantian Conception ofAutonomy, in
THE INNER CITADEL 91, 97 (John Christman ed., 1989).
20 "[A] human being regarded as a person ... is [I to be valued ... as an end in it-
self, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts re-
spect for himself from all other rational beings in the world." IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 557 (Mary J. Gregor ed. &
trans., 1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS]. See PAUL
GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 154, 203, 239-40 (2000); THOMAS E.
HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY 10, 47-48 (1992)
[hereinafter HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON]; THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Social
Snobbery and Human Dignity, in AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 155, 169 (1991) [here-
inafter HILL, JR., Social Snobbery] ("moral virtue is not a prerequisite of dignity; even
the grossly immoral have it"); WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT, supra note 19, at
121; Diana T. Meyers, Self-Respect and Autonomy, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER, AND SELF-
RESPECT 218, 229 (Robin S. Dillon ed., 1995).
21 See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT 14 (2006). See also
MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS 157-59 (2002) [hereinafter DAN-COHEN,
HARMFUL THOUGHTS] (analyzing dignity and autonomy as independent notions).
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universally legislating" for a realm of equally qualified co-
legislators.22
While, like others, I do not claim that Kant would go along with
all of the positions taken in this article,23 the notions of the right to
respect, as well as the duty to respect, stem from Kantian roots.24
What I grow from these roots may not be fully embraced by Kant
himself.
Having met the necessary threshold of rationality capability,25 a
person's autonomy commands respect. Michael Sandel puts Kant's
idea of autonomy as, "To be free is to be autonomous, and to be
22 GUYER, supra note 20, at 142 (citations omitted). For another translation with a
succinct explanation, see Allen W. Wood, General Introduction, in IMMANUEL KANT,
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY viii, xxiii-xxiv (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). That treat-
ing people as a end in themselves may be distinguished from not treating them as a
mere means, see F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 13 (2007); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY
81-85 (2012); T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME
ch. 3 (2008) [hereinafter SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS] ("Means and Ends").
23 See HILL, supra note 20, at 1 ("Few ethical theories, if any, have been ... as vari-
ously interpreted as Immanuel Kant's."); ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S
MORAL THEORY xi (1989). "Kant makes many conflicting claims... [and] 'is the least
exact of the great thinkers."' 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS xlii (2011) (quoting
Norman Kemp Smith, Kant's Method of Composing the Critique of Pure Reason, 24 PHIL.
REV. 526, 527 (1915)).
24 "Kantian ethics, [as distinguished from Kant's ethics,] is an ethical theory formu-
lated in the basic spirit of Kant, drawing on and acknowledging a debt to what the
author of the theory takes to be his insights in moral philosophy." ALLEN W. WOOD,
KANTIAN ETHICS 1 (2008) [hereinafter WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS]. See JOHN RAWLS,
Kantian Constructlvism in Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 303, 304-05 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999).
25 Rationality "is a normative concept that can take on various meanings accord-
ing to differing moral and political judgments about how society should govern
itself." Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 254
(2000) [hereinafter Morse, Rationality]. For guidance to the meaning of rationality,
both "thick" and "thin" versions, see id. at 254-55 ("Rationality is of course a contin-
uum concept .. "). "All formal definitions [of rationality] found in the literatures of
economics, philosophy, and psychology are contestable ...." Stephen J. Morse, Di-
minished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 239, 248 (Stephen Shute et
al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Capacity].
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autonomous is to be governed by a law I give myself." 26 There are
many meanings of "autonomy". 27 "Put most simply, to be autono-
mous is to be one's own person, to be directed by considerations,
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be consid-
ered one's authentic self." 28
All conduct by one agent imposes limitations on other per-
sons.29 Indeed, the very existence of an agent imposes limitations on
26 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE 214 (2009). "[Tjhe most basic autonomy-right is the
right to decide how one is to live one's life, in particular how to make the critical life-
decisions .... " JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 54 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM
TO SELF]. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HAWORTH, AUTONOMY 1 (1986) [hereinafter HAWORTH,
AUTONOMY]; CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY 31, 62 (2008);
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 222 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; ANDREWS REATH, Legislating the Moral Law, in AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN
KANT'S MORAL THEORY 92, 96 (2006); Marina A.L. Oshana, Personal Autonomy and
Society, 29 J. Soc. PHIL. 81, 82 (1998); James S. Taylor, Introduction, in PERSONAL
AUTONOMY 1, 1, 4-23 (James S. Taylor ed., 2005).27 
"[T]here is no uniform understanding about what autonomy is." THOMAS E.
HILL, JR., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, in AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT, supra note
20, at 25, 25 . See THOMAS E. HILL, JR., The Importance of Autonomy, in AUTONOMY AND
SELF-RESPECT, supra note 20, at 43, 44 ("the relations among the different senses of
autonomy are staggeringly complex"); ONORA O'NEIL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 29 (2000);
MARINA OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SOCIETY 10-14, 77-88, 178 (2006) [herein-
after OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY]; Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in
THE INNER CITADEL 54, 54 (John Christman ed., 1989); Thomas May, The Concept of
Autonomy, 31 AM. PHIL. Q. 133, 133 (1994) ("the concept remains vague at best"). For
a range of meanings, see, e.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY 5-6, 34-35, 108 (1988) [hereinafter DWORKIN, THEORY AND PRACTICE];
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 27-97; JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 369-429 (1986); WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 24, at 106-22; Tom L.
Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 55, 61-74 (Franklin G.
Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Autonomy and Con-
sent]; PERSONAL AUTONOMY (James S. Taylor ed., 2005).
28 John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112009/entries/autonomy-moral/ (last visited
Aug. 7, 2013).
29 See GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY 100 (2011) ("Life is affecting and being af-
fected, influencing and being influenced.").
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others if for no other reason than that two people cannot occupy the
same place at the same time. 30 Increasing liberty for one person typ-
ically decreases security for another, and vice versa, as where an
agent's freedom to swing her hand normally ends somewhere short
of another person's nose.31 So the question is not whether there are
limitations to one's autonomy space, one's freedom, but rather what
the boundaries will be and how they are to be drawn. 32 Liberty and
security interests require tradeoffs that must be balanced. 33 Where
"Conduct" means either action or inaction, as where a person is allowed or obli-
gated to turn over resources, or is denied the opportunity to do so. See PETER CANE,
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 78 (2002) [hereinafter CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN
LAW].
30 More generally, "[tihe interests of different persons are constantly and una-
voidably in conflict .. " JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 35 (1984).
31 Locke emphasizes the security provided by the social contract. "The Reason
why Men enter into Society is the preservation of their Property.... [They authorize
laws] to limit the Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of
the society." JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 265, 412 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690). "[Tjhe people ... provide for
their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in Society." Id. at
412-13. Mill gives security a central place in his moral and political principles. See
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 67 (1st ed. London 1863). "Mill sees security (un-
derstood in [an] expansive way) as both a precondition and a defining feature of a
civilized society." Glyn Morgan, The Mode and Limits of John Stuart Mill's Toleration, in.
TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 139, 151 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds.,
2008). Blackstone, less expansively than Mill, defines "the absolute rights of each
individual . . . to be the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and
the right of private property .... " 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119
(1768). See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 190 (1961); CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 99 (1996) [hereinafter KORSGAARD, CREATING THE
KINGDOM]; Ren6 Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Notions, in MODERN FRENCH
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 345, 418 (Mrs. Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P. Chamberlain trans.,
1921). "Without such [personal] security society loses most of its value." Beach v.
Hancock, 27 N.H. 223, 229 (1853).
32 "[Tlhe idea of freedom [is] an inescapably pluralist notion." SEN, RATIONALITY,
supra note 14, at 658. See WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 24, at 123-41.
33 "To protect certain kinds of freedom and suppress other kinds is one of the
principal functions of a legal system .... MORRIS R. COHEN, Freedom: Its Meaning, in
THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 161, 163 (1946). Commentators have declared that various
legal principles found in tort, contract, and criminal law are designed to fairly bal-
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the line is drawn may be a matter of distributive justice.34 Be that as
it may, the balance in a Kantian regime must accord with the digni-
ty principle of the categorical imperative.35 When a person violates
the established balance, requiting it is a matter of corrective justice
or retribution. The interrelationship among these three types of jus-
tice strikes me as more intricate than this commonly ascribed divi-
sion of labor. Principles of distributive justice may well mark an
initial, prima facie tradeoff between liberty and security, but the
associated conceptions of corrective and retributive justice ultimate-
ly affect that balance. For example, if an agent wrongfully hits an-
other person, whether that wrong is requitable by imprisonment, by
damages for all harms, foreseeable or not, by damages for the fore-
seeable physical harm only, or is fully satisfied by a formal apology,
ance liberty and security interests. See, e.g., WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE
LAW 407-08 (2007) (contract); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
LAW 6-7, 55 (1999) [hereinafter EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY] (tort and criminal law);
Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in ANALYZING LAW 257,
304 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) (fault principle); Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory:
Preliminary Reflections on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 183, 213 n.37
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (ditto); Gerald J. Postema, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 1, 6 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (negligence and strict liabil-
ity); Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 LAW & PHIL.
751, 761 (2000) (reasonable person standard); Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 61, 69-72 (2007) (ditto). See Anita Bernstein, The Communities
That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 736 n.5 (2002) (citing
Jules L. Coleman, John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Stephen G. Gilles,
and Gregory C. Keating).
34 See CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW supra note 29, at 79 (citing EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 33); IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES 198 (2009); Peter Benson, The Basis of Cor-
rective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992).
35 "No society fully realizes the dignity of the individual .... " KATEB, supra note
29, at ix. Rawls identifies a four-step categorical imperative procedure. See JOHN
RAWLS, Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy, in COLLECTED PAPERS 497, 498-506 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 1999). "This procedure helps to determine the content of the moral law
as it applies to us as reasonable and rational persons endowed with conscience and
moral sensibility, and affected by, but not determined by, our natural desires and
inclinations." Id. at 498.
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vitally affects our understanding of the overall balance between
liberty and security.
Liberty refers to the freedom to choose particular conduct,36
while security refers to the freedom from being acted upon or being
obligated to engage in particular conduct. 37 At their most general
level, liberty and security relate to the effect of powers or forces, or
their absence, on a person's possible conduct choices. 38 Powers or
forces have overlapping sources, including: nature (e.g., weather,
animals, biology); resources (wherewithal, drive); institutions (con-
stitutions, norms); and, other humans (prowess, arms, status). They
may be internal (akrasia, anomie, timidity, indecisiveness, guilt,
greed, obsession, impulse, phobia, addiction, kleptomania, self-
deception), 39 or external (coercion, inhibiting social norms, black-
36 After Moore identifies conceptual and normative issues regarding the notion of
liberty, see MOORE, supra note 1, at 739-40, he "cut[s] through this Gordian knot with
a simple stipulative definition that adopts the traditional, negative definition of liber-
ty: liberty is the absence of constraint, and political liberty is the absence of coercive
legal sanctions." Id. at 741. Rawls "bypass[es] the dispute about the meaning of liber-
ty that has so often troubled this topic" and "assume[s] that any liberty ... has the
following form: this or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that
constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so." RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 176-77. As I use these terms, "liberty is a subset of all 'free-
doms."' Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985
DUKE L.J. 541, 591.
37 "The interest in liberty requires a protected space for freedom of action, the abil-
ity to carry out one's purposes in the world. The interest in security requires that the
limits be imposed on the actions of others." EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 33,
at 50.
38 My use of "power" or "force" is uncommonly broad. For a definition restricted
to influences by humans, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. GORR, COERCION, FREEDOM AND
EXPLOITATION 52 (1989). "As is well known, the relation between liberty and power
is ambiguous, or at least debatable." J. Roland Pennock, Coercion: An Overview, in
COERCION 1, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972).
39 See ALAN DONAGAN, CHOICE: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN HUMAN ACTION 147-
56 (1987); Laura W. Ekstrom, Autonomy and Personal Integration, in PERSONAL
AUTONOMY 143, 145-46 (James S. Taylor ed., 2005); Robert Noggle, Autonomy and the
Paradox of Self-Creation, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY 87, 87 (James S. Taylor ed., 2005).
Ekstrom notes that "the difficult issue of settling which forces are external and which
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mail, shame, weather, climate),40 and active (weather, human ac-
tions, imminent animal threats), or passive (norms, barriers, power
outages, collapsed bridges). 41 While security and liberty may be
limited or facilitated by various sources, the ones of primary moral
interest are those ascribable to human agents. 42
In balancing the inevitable conflicts between liberty and securi-
ty interests, all moral agents are to have the most expansive liberty
possible while, at the same time, respecting the security interests of
(themselves and) others.43 In Kant's words, "Freedom (independence
from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law,
is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his
humanity." 44 The adopted balance between liberty and security
produces autonomy boundaries between agents.
The conceptions of liberty and security discussed in this article
have much in common with related notions of liberty and rights
are internal to the agent himself (which are 'truly his own')" has given rise to a de-
bate among commentators. Ekstrom, supra, at 146.
40 See MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LAW 9 (1987) (noting that some factors
are borderline external or internal); Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, supra note 27,
at 69 (emphasizing persuasion, coercion, and manipulation); Lawrence Haworth,
Autonomy and Utility, in THE INNER CITADEL 155, 163 (John Christman ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Haworth, Autonomy and Utility] (noting "preferences resulting from
pervasive acculturation or socialization processes which are not directly manipula-
tive in the ways of brainwashing and subliminal advertising are."). For the difficulty
in identifying a criterion for autonomous preferences, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes -
Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in THE INNER CITADEL 170, 176-79 (John
Christman ed., 1989).
41 As the examples reveal, the active-passive distinction may be more polar than
dichotomous.
42 "[Ihf the 'threat to B comes from nature (say, a sickness) rather than from A or
any other person, than in all probability we would take that threat simply to be one
of the background conditions ... rather than an intervening force .... FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 196 (reference omitted).
43 See Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1391, 1417 (2006).
44 KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20,
at 393.
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categories recognized by various commentators. Isaiah Berlin
championed the most famous distinction, the one between negative
and positive liberty.45 Under his analysis, negative liberty is the
freedom to act without "obstacles, barriers or constraints."46 Nega-
tive liberty, in a nutshell, is freedom from. 4 7 Freedom from, accord-
ing to Berlin, relates to external factors.48 Positive liberty, on the
other hand, is the freedom with respect to internal, psychological
constraints.49 It is the freedom to.50 This distinction between Berlin's
conceptions of positive and negative liberty, while embraced by
others,5 1 may be ambiguous, 5 2 and has been strongly challenged.53
45 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118
(1969).
4 Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112008/entries/liberty-positive-negative (last
visited Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty]. "One has nega-
tive liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense." Id.
47 "We are free in the negative sense if we are free from being arrested for speak-
ing our minds, being attacked as we walk in the street, being forcibly prevented from
meeting with others." VIRGINIA HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS 124 (1984). See SEN,
RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 508.
48 See Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, supra note 46.
49 "Positive liberty is the possibility of acting - or the fact of action - in such a way
as to take control of one's life and realize one's fundamental purposes." Id. "[1It
seems to require the presence of something (i.e. of control, self-mastery, self-
determination or self-realization)." Id.
50 "[W]e are free in the positive sense when we are guided by our better, rational
selves rather than by our passions, free to do what we ought to do." HELD, supra note
47, at 125.
51 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 19 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter HAYEK, CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]; John Christman, Saving Positive Freedom, 33
POL. THEORY 79 (2005); David Miller, Constraints on Freedom, 94 ETHICS 66 (1983);
Marina A.L. Oshana, Autonomy and Free Agency, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY 183, 193-96
(James S. Taylor ed., 2005); Theodore L. Putterman, Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty: A
Reassessment and Revision, 38 POLITY 416 (2006).
52 "[T]he distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' freedoms ... can be inter-
preted in several distinct ways." SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 509 (footnote
omitted). For various interpretations of both positive and negative freedom, see SEN,
RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 586-87.
5 See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES 65 (2011) [hereinafter
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES]; OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 27,
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Other commentators have identified distinctions between active
and passive rights, or negative and positive rights. First, active and
passive rights. "Active rights are signaled by statements of the form
'A has a right to 4'; while passive rights are signaled by statements
of the form 'A has a right that B 4)' (in both of these formulas, '4)' is
an active verb)." 54 Second, negative and positive rights. "The holder
of a negative right is entitled to non-interference, while the holder
of a positive right is entitled to provision of some good or service."55
My look at liberty and security interests begins with expansive
conceptions that extend beyond the common normative realm in
which entitlement claims are salient, as where one claims to have
the right to be secure from assault and battery. Freedom, for in-
stance, may further entail claims to a minimal level of resources or
enablements, such as rights to welfare. As in some of the taxono-
mies above, liberty and security typically come in overlapping,
sometimes indistinct, negative and positive varieties, as well as ac-
at 152; Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312
(1967), Eric Nelson, Liberty: One Concept Too Many?, 33 POL. THEORY 58 (2005);
Westen, supra note 36, at 553. See generally Joshua Cherniss & Henry Hardy, Isaiah
Berlin, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2OlO/entries/berlin (last visited Aug. 7,
2013). Notice that reliance on this common model of positive and negative liberty
does not fit with symmetrical notions of positive and negative security.
54 Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights (last visited Aug. 7,
2013) (citing David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 Nous 45 (1970)). "A
naval captain has an active privilege-right to walk the decks and an active power-
right to order that the ship set sail. A college professor has a passive claim-right that
students not disrupt her lectures, and a passive immunity-right that her university
not fire her for publishing unpopular views." Id. See Ray Jackendoff, The Natural
Logic of Morals and of Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 379, 394-95 (2002).
55 Wenar, supra note 54 (citing JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA (1988)).
"Since both negative and positive rights are passive rights, this division cannot cap-
ture all rights." Wenar, supra note 54. "Whatever is the justification of ascribing
rights - autonomy, need, or something else - there may be just as strong a case for
ensuring that a person has adequate nutrition as for ensuring that the person not be
beat up." Wenar, supra note 54, at 11. See KAMM, supra note 22, at 286; RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 98.
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tive and passive ones. The Hohfeldian correlatives capture many of
the characteristics. 56
III. AUTONOMY SPACE
The term "autonomy space" metaphorically represents the idea
that a moral agent has a certain realm of freedom in space and time
to make choices and act upon them. Within this realm the agent can
conduct her life free from interference by others.57 As one commen-
tator puts it, it is her "discretionary space". 58 This space is estab-
lished by a full set of universalized deontic maxims, both first- and
second-order, adopted by a moral agent to balance her liberty and
security interests within the parameters of the categorical impera-
tive.59 Once an agent's baseline autonomy space is demarcated, she
can usually adjust the boundaries by consent.60 One can consent to a
56 See WESLEY N. HoHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23 (1923).
57 "Boundaries defining personal space are necessary to constitute individuals."
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS 22 (2007)
[hereinafter, FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW] (footnote omitted). In-
cluded within "[tlhe contours of the individual" are one's body, "the things under
one's immediate control", one's own living space, and, furthermore, it also reaches
"the right to act in certain ways and to control larger spaces on the basis of a social
understanding of ownership." Id. at 22-23. Others also use the domain, territory, and
space metaphors. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 52-57; LEO KATZ, ILL-
GOTTEN GAINS 139 (1996) (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57
(1974)).
8 "If we think of each person as having rights to control certain features of the
world, then each person has a sphere of discretionary space, that is, a domain within
which she is entitled to control what happens." Japa Pallikkathayil, Deriving Morality
from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121 ETHICS 116, 133 (2010).
59 See Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, (Dec. 1, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Tel Aviv University Journal of Tort Law).
60 In the manner of one of the lessons of the Coase theorem, parties may negotiate
over a preferred balance of their baseline, reciprocal liberty and security interests.
For example, one may seek permission to touch another person in a way that is oth-
erwise disallowed by default, and that other person may grant that permission, both
parties thereby adjusting the boundaries between themselves in a way that satisfies
them both. A consumer surplus, of sorts, results.
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reduction of one's autonomy space (e.g., permit non-everyday con-
tact by another), and also decline an expansion of the space (refuse
a beneficial gift). Some autonomy boundaries are immutable, par-
tially or entirely. For example, consensual slavery, mutilation, or
sexual contracts may be declared out of bounds for being disre-
spectful of one's own status as a moral, autonomous being.
61
Many interferences with, or limitations on, a person's plausible
autonomy space are not found to be wrongful, and hence not sub-
ject to moral or legal requitals. Under existing norms, for example, a
variety of acceptable social touchings or contacts circumscribe a
person's liberty and security interests, such as an ordinary pat on
the back.62 No applicable maxim prohibits touchings of the types in
question. Though they may be harmful, they are not wrongful. On
the other hand, if such contacts were proscribed by an adopted sub-
stantive maxim, and a violation therefore within the reach of a re-
quital maxim, such a substantive maxim would not necessarily run
afoul of the categorical imperative. Just as allowing some contact
need not be disrespectful, so banning all social touchings need not
be disrespectful. When not wrongful, we would not say that the
invasion of the autonomy space is privileged, but rather, owing to
implicit consent, that there was no invasion at all.63 For each society,
61 See IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING: THAT MAY BE CORRECT IN
THEORY, BUT IT IS OF No USE IN PRACTICE, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at
273, 293-94 [hereinafter KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING]; KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 20, at 431, 471-72. But see, e.g.,
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 331 (1974) (opining that "a free sys-
tem will allow [a person] to sell himself into slavery").
62 See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 205 (2010) [here-
inafter GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, TORTS]; KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 4142; Paul H.
Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability,
23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 268 (1975); Sheinman, Tort Law, supra note 2, at 53.
63 "The absence of ... consent is inherent in the very idea of those invasions of in-
terests of personality which, at common law, were the subject of an action of trespass
for battery, assault, or false imprisonment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13
cmt. d (1977). "The consent principle is general in its scope, firm in its acceptance,
and central in its significance. It makes the plaintiff's right of self-determination or
CONSTRUCTING AUTONOMY
where to strike this balance between liberty and security is a, if not
the, central issue.
A nonwrongful limitation to an agent's possible autonomy
space will be referred to as a "reduction", "decrease", "curtail-
ment", "limitation", "restriction", "truncation", etc. Some commen-
tators use the term "infringement", but this has overtones of "viola-
tion" or "wrongfulness". 64 To the contrary of an autonomy space
reduction, there may be an "enlargement", "increase", etc., as
where an agent is granted the privilege to touch another person in a
manner beyond default norms. When an interference with a per-
son's autonomy space is wrongful, and hence subject to requital,
this is referred to as an autonomy, or autonomy space, invasion.
The essentially contested, 65 fuzzy concepts of liberty, security,
autonomy, dignity,66 respect,67 etc., are mustered to point down var-
ious promising roads suggested by deontic principles. I largely de-
cline to opine how far down the road these concepts go, or whether
particular roads can be traveled as a practical matter, or even
whether other normative principles may trump these pathways in a
particular society's web of norms and values. 68 My primary aim is
autonomy the centerpiece of the law on intentional torts and to some extent other
torts as well." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 217 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW
OF TORTS].
64 See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, Tort Law as a Comparative Institution: Reply to Perry, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939, 946 (1992); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on
Rights, 19 ARIz. L. REV 45, 47 (1977) (distinguishing "infringement" from "violation").
65 See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167
(1955-56).
66 See infra note 196.
67 "[Tlhe concept of 'disrespect' is simply too elastic and vague to illuminate that
range of doctrines within criminal law. It is even more clearly insufficient to illumi-
nate doctrines across fields of law." Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinkzng Mental States, 72
B.U. L. REV. 463, 528 n.222 (1992).
68 "[T]heories are not arguments, sound or otherwise. Theories are maps." David
Schmidtz, Nonideal Theory: What It Is and What It Needs to Be, 121 ETHICS 772, 778
(2011). "[Ilt is not only maps that are incomplete. The terrain being described (i.e.,
justice itself) can be incomplete as well." Id. at 779. "A theory of justice may give us
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to identify the process behind some of the critical choices and
tradeoffs that individuals and societies must address in embracing a
set of norms that satisfy deontic mandates. They are constitutive of
an agent's autonomy space. Whether our current social, moral, and
legal norms, or those of any other society, meet Kant's marching
orders is another question.
A. CONDITIONS FOR AUTONOMY SPACE
Within an agent's autonomy space, the agent is free to make
choices that utilize her expanse of liberty and protect her sphere of
security. Indeed, free, responsible choice is central to an agent's full
usage of her realm of freedom.69 Conversely, we respect her as a
parameters, some of which may be more or less timeless. Even so, details of evolving
practices are in the hands of communities, not theories." Id. at 784 (footnote omitted).
69 "[Tlhe term act implies a choice." HOLMES, supra note 6, at 77. "But why should
liability depend on choice? Because choice, it is thought, is the defining mark of
agency; it marks the point at which we engage in the world as free and responsible
agents, and thus bring ourselves within the proper reach of the criminal law." R.A.
DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 154 (1990). "We need only recog-
nize why we respect people's choices - because we respect people and their innate
dignity." Robert E. Goodin, The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity, 18 AM. PHIL. Q.
91, 91 (1981). "Choice and autonomy in this way mutually reinforce one another: we
value autonomy in part because of the freedom to choose it validates, and we value
free choice in part because it contributes to our autonomy." DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL
THOUGHTS, supra note 21, at 125. See DWORKIN, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 27,
at 18; SANFORD H. KADISH, Excusing Crime, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 81, 88 (1987)
("choice as a condition of blame"); OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 27, at
133.
Not all agree that responsibility entails choice. See CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW,
supra note 29, at 97-104; VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 61-66 (2005)
(doubting the importance of choice to autonomy and responsibility); Stephen Shute
et al., Introduction: The Logic of Criminal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW
1, 20 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (responsibility "depends primarily on control of
conduct and self-control, not on choice"); Michael McKenna, The Relationship Between
Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY 205 (James S.
Taylor ed., 2005); T.M. Scanlon, Ethics and Free Will: Varieties of Responsibility, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 603, 603-04 (2010) (distinguishing three varieties of responsibility: personal,
moral, and substantive); Stephen A. Smith, Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of
Duress, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 343 (1997) (distinguishing the concerns of wrongdoing,
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person by holding her accountable for her responsible choices.70
Aristotle identified the circumstances where choices and conduct
should not be considered free, responsible ones: those that result
from unavoidable ignorance or coercion.71 As an example of the
adoption of Aristotle's viewpoint by common law courts, in the
leading case establishing fault, negligence, as the standard for tort
liability for unintentional conduct, Weaver v. Ward, 72 the court dis-
cusses hypothetical examples of when liability is exempted.7 3 As
George Fletcher observes, "The hypotheticals of Weaver v. Ward cor-
autonomy, and consent); Nicole A. Vincent, On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 77, 84 (2010) (noting six conceptions of responsi-
bility).
1o "To hold someone responsible is to regard her as a person - that is to say, as a
free and equal person, capable of acting both rationally and morally." KORSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 189.
71 "Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compul-
sion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is
outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is act-
ing or is feeling the passion .... ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1, in
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). See id. at bk. Il,
ch. 8, 964-67, bk. V, ch. 8, 1015-16. "Since Aristotle, moral theorists have generally
agreed that the necessary attributes of moral agency fall under three categories:
knowledge, reason, and control." Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless:
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1511, 1519 (1992). See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 115; JOHN MARTIN
FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 12 (1998); KORSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 295; GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? 4, 143
(2009); MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PROMISES 112 (1998); Michael McKenna &
David Widerker, Introduction, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALTERNATIVE
POSSIBILITIES 1, 2 (David Widerker & Michael McKenna eds., 2003); Arthur Ripstein,
Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 362, 377 (2004) [hereinafter
Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility]; Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543,
548-54 (1983). "One might even contend that people are denied respect if they are
held legally liable when they are not responsible, because they are then treated as
mere instruments for the well-being of others." BAYLES, supra note 40, at 8.
72 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
73 Id.
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respond to the Aristotelian excusing categories of compulsion and
unavoidable ignorance."
74
While the notion of ignorance is far from entirely self-evident,
75
that of coercion is blurrier still.76 Peter Westen provides a pointer in
the right direction: "A coercive constraint is anything that leaves a
person worse off either than he otherwise expects to be or than he
ought to be for refusing to do the proponent's bidding."77 I would
expand on this to include nonagential "bidding", such as from a
storm, a threatening animal, or an irresistible impulse. 78 Like igno-
14 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 552
(1972).
75 Feinberg discusses at length failures of consent from defective belief. See
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 269-315.
76 "[Flew agree on what counts as coercion.... [Nbo analysis has been generally
accepted as convincing." O'NEIL, supra note 27, at 81. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,
supra note 26, at 189; MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
78-101 (1993); Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa1l2008/entries/coercion/ (last visited Aug. 7,
2013); May, supra note 27, at 133; Morse, Rationality, supra note 25, at 256-66.
7 Westen, supra note 36, at 589 (offering a detailed specification of "coercion").
Westen identifies "the core elements of coercion", id. at 559-69. See HAYEK,
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 51, 20-21; Eric Chwang, On Coerced Promises, in
PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS 156 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011); Morse, Diminished
Capacity, supra note 25, at 250-52; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard
Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 85-86 (1981); Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L.
REV. 103, 126 (1981); Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT 195, 198 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). For criminal
coercion, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (1962).
78 Anderson points out that "coercion" can be used "with a quite broad sense."
Anderson, supra note 76. "Coercion belongs to a family of 'power' or 'influence' con-
cepts .... Alan P. Wertheimer, Political Coercion and Political Obligation, in COERCION
213, 221 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972). For a discussion of the
variations among commentators as to the sources (e.g., other people, natural obsta-
cles) and types (e.g., physical barriers, disincentives, manipulation) of constraints
that count in gauging negative freedom, see Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, supra
note 46. See Ian Carter, The Myth of 'Merely Formal Freedom', 19 J. POL. PHIL. 486, 492-
94 (2011) [hereinafter Carter, The Myth] ("normatively loaded" versus "normatively
neutral" conceptions of freedom and "interpersonal" or "social" conceptions of free-
dom versus "freedom-as-ability"). For a taxonomy of types of coercion, see Samuel
D. Cook, Coercion and Social Change, in COERCION 107, 116 (J. Roland Pennock & John
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rance, coercion is, of course, a matter of degree.79 Existing norms
require coercive forces to pass a certain threshold, which depends
on the circumstances, 80 before they excuse an agent from responsi-
bility.
Ignorance and coercion can stem from sources that are external
from the agent or internal to her, that is, arise from internal analogs
to external conditions,81 or be a mixture of the two. 82 Let me provide
some examples of what I mean by internal and external ignorance
and coercion. First, internal ignorance may arise from cognitive dis-
sonance, self-deception, and the many self-generated or self-
exacerbated shortfalls from accurate perceptions and knowledge
uncovered in recent decades by behavioral economists and cogni-
W. Chapman eds., 1972). See generally COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1972).
79 "One can think of voluntariness as a matter of degree." FEINBERG, HARM TO
SELF, supra note 26, at 104. "It may not always be possible, even in principle, to say of
one act that it is more voluntary or closer to being voluntary than another .... Id. at
117. See CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, supra note 29, at 34.
1o "Rather than undermining responsibility, what coercion may do is to modify
the permissibility of an action or the kind of blame, if any, that it makes appropri-
ate." SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 22, at 181. Gratuitous harm to anoth-
er is one thing, fearful reactive harm is quite another. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 22, at 181. See TUNICK, supra note 71, at 101-02.
81 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT LAW 106 (1996)
[hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS] ("The internal analogue to external pressure
is mental illness."); RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 15; Michael C.
Munger, Euvoluntary or Not, Exchange Is Just, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 192, 195 (2011);
Morse, Diminished Capacity, supra note 25, at 250-66. Morse writes that "cases of pure
internal coercion, compulsion, or 'volitional' problems are extremely rare." Morse,
Diminished Capacity, supra note 25, at 261. "On both theoretical and practical grounds,
the law should treat internal-coercion claims with great caution." Morse, Diminished
Capacity, supra note 25, at 270. The law and legal philosophers predominantly reject
such claims. See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Rethinking Unreasonableness: A Comment on
Nita Farahany's "Law and Behavioral Morality", in EVOLUTION AND MORALITY 166, 167
(James E. Fleming & Sanford Levinson eds., 2012). For exceptions, see, e.g., Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, A Case Study in Neuroscience and Responsibility, in EVOLUTION AND
MORALITY 194, 205-06 (James E. Fleming & Sanford Levinson eds., 2012).
82 See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 151-52; TUNICK, supra note 71, at
101-02.
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tive psychologists.8 3 Second, internal coercion results from some
forms of insanity, impulse, anomie, stress,8 4 akrasia, and, again,
what cognitive science is revealing.85 Third, external ignorance may
be a product of fraud, deception, and the failure to collect available
information. Finally, fourth, a gun to the head paradigmatically ex-
emplifies external coercion.8 6
Ignorance and coercion may be permanent (e.g., insanity, psy-
chological enslavement [undue influence]), episodic (insanity,
drunkenness, road rage, imprisonment), or transitory (economic
duress, necessity, preliminary misinformation).87 Overall, ignorance
83 See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., 2003); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
84 See Hila Keren, Consenting Under Distress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679 (2012). "Most
courts do not view stress that leads a person to accept an injurious contract, as a
sufficient reason for relief from that contract." Id. at 683.
85 See supra text accompanying note 83. "[S]elf-rule is not possible if the person's
passions and impulses dictate his responses, so that he is led to do that which, had
he reflected, he would have avoided doing." HAWORTH, AUTONOMY, supra note 26, at
43. Regarding voluntary choices, Trebilcock identifies "temporarily distorting states
or circumstances, including: impulsiveness; fatigue; excess nervousness, agitation, or
excitation; powerful passion (e.g., rage, hatred, lust, depression, mania); intoxication
(alcohol and other drugs); pain; neurotic compulsiveness/ obsessiveness; severe time
constraint." TREBILCOCK, supra note 76, at 148 (punctuation and capitalization re-
vised).
"In general, those who write about criminal law have been much more skeptical
than philosophers about whether a plausible account of volitional disorders can be
given." TADROS, supra note 69, at 340.
86 Fischer and Ravizza mention "brainwashing, hypnosis, or direct manipulation
of the brain," as well as "subliminal advertising". FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 71,
at 13, 49. "[Tlhe agent must control his behavior in a suitable sense, in order to be
morally responsible for it." FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 71, at 13. They briefly
summarize the "suitable sense" for sufficient control. FISCHER AND RAVIZZA, supra
note 71, at 240-41.
87 "The voluntariness-reducing incapacities can be divided in respect to their du-
rability into two major classes, those thought to be permanent impairments and
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and coercion, both internal and external, or permanent to transitory,
interrelate in complex, multiple ways. For example, a person may
exploit another's known cognitive weaknesses in particular settings
by creating such a setting and practicing subtle deception, as where
a mediocre, overpriced product is displayed in a plush showroom
by attractive, seductive salespersons.88 Hypnotism and brainwash-
ing also have external and internal aspects.8 9
B. THE MACHINERY OF AUTONOMY SPACE
Without certain qualities needed to utilize one's autonomy
space, it is a formal conception only. One who is semi-comatose is
free in a very restricted sense, if at all. To be free in a real sense, a
person must have, first, sufficient capabilities or personal re-
sources,90 which are qualities of the person. Because people vary in
their capabilities, native and developed, they vary in the extent to
which they can take advantage of potential autonomy space. Native
capabilities include, to some extent, intelligence, athleticism, attrac-
tiveness, and some personality traits, such as risk disposition and
those deemed merely temporary, and a third overlapping category for alternating or
recurring impairments." FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 318.
88 See Collin O'Neil, Lying, Trust, and Gratitude, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 301, 301 (2012)
("identiflying] twelve distinct deceptive techniques deployed in political advertise-
ments"). On subliminal advertising, see generally VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN
PERSUADERS (1957). For doubts about Packard's arguments, see GERALD ZALTMAN,
How CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF THE MARKET 127
(2003); Richard A. Bauer, The Limits of Persuasion, 36 HARV. L. REV. 105, 106 (1958);
Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 244 (2013).
89 Cf. TREBILCOCK, supra note 76, at 148 ("subliminal suggestion; post-hypnotic
suggestion; 'sleep-teaching,' etc.").
90 "Someone's personal resources are his physical and mental capacities
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 355 (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS]. "I take it that an account of autonomy should capture the
agentic resourcefulness people need to cope with life's vicissitudes, ordeals, and
upheavals." Diana T. Meyers, Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selfhood, in
AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 27, 27 (John Christman & Joel An-
derson eds., 2005). See Thom Brooks, Capabilities, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ETHICS 692 (H. LaFollette ed., 2013).
2015]
402 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 9:375
attention disorder. 91 Developed capabilities, insofar as they are a
product of (self) nurture rather than nature, include education,
knowledge, skill, willpower, and self-discipline. 92
The exercise of capabilities may reflect an interrelationship
among them. A brilliant person, for example, needs less willpower
than others to succeed in school. Capabilities are relative, circum-
stantial competencies ("In the land of the blind. ). The greater a
person's relevant capabilities, the greater her effective, usable au-
tonomy space, all else equal.93 These variable contingencies affect an
agent's material autonomy space,94 as distinguished from the for-
mal autonomy space possessed in principle equally by all. Autono-
my in practice, then, is quantifiable by a scalar measure, a matter of
more or less. 95
For a person to have full legal and deontic status, a threshold
standard of minimum capabilities is typically declared as essential.
91 What are known as the Big Five personality dispositions are partially innate and
heritable, the heritability according to studies given in brackets: openness [57%],
conscientiousness 149%], extraversion [54%], agreeableness [42%], and neuroticism
[48%]. See Thomas J. Bouchard & Matt McGue, Genetic and Environmental Influences on
Human Psychological Differences, 54 J. NEUROBIOLOGY 4 (2003).
92 "[N]atural diversity may arise from any combination of ordinary genetic varia-
tions, self-caused factors, and differential luck." Thomas Pogge, A Critique of the Ca-
pability Approach, in MEASURING JUSTICE 17, 32 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns
eds., 2010).
93 "A person with energy, intelligence, good health, and good looks is better able
to advance her conception of the good than someone who is sickly, gloomy, unintel-
ligent, and ugly." Pogge, supra note 92, at 34.
94 Similarly, Nussbaum, along with Sen, advances a conception of a functioning.
"A functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities." NUSSBAUM,
CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 53, at 24-25.
95 Haworth identifies various stages of autonomy: minimal autonomy, a transition
stage, normal autonomy, "[aind finally, further growth of autonomy, beyond the
norm, by which one gets more completely free from inner and outer constraints and
realizes something close to unrestricted critical competence." HAWORTH, AUTONOMY,
supra note 26, at 55. "[Slome [people] are more autonomous than others." Id. at 83.
For more on the scalar qualities of autonomy, see, e.g., RICHARD LINDLEY, AUTONOMY
51, 69 (1986).
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Beyond this, she usually has no increased rights or duties. 96 There
are exceptions to this, as under existing tort law where a person
who holds herself out as an expert thereby assumes heightened du-
ties.97 Children and mental incompetents do not fit neatly into this
paradigm, but must, of course, be accommodated. 98 Yet, despite the
threshold capabilities standard of law and deontology, the effect of
one's capabilities on her material autonomy space seems continu-
ously additive. As evident when we consider realistically the vastly
different opportunities of the klutzes and the demigods, the greater
one's capabilities, the greater one's effective, usable freedoms.
External resources are needed to employ one's formal autono-
my space. 99 Wealth, opportunity, and privilege, for example, facili-
tate the exercise of liberty. 100 Similarly, outside resources may ex-
pand a person's security, as when some touchings are normally
96 See supra text accompanying note 25.
97 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. d (1977). Even if a person
with superior skills does not hold herself out as such, should she be held to a higher
standard? See James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Blameworthiness
and Liability for Negligence, 28 MELB. U.L. REV. 343, 344, 351-55 (2004) ("moral cen-
sure"). For interesting questions about adjusting standards of care on the basis of
individual skill levels, see Bernstein, supra note 33, at 748-50.
98 "It is my judgment that the greatest challenge facing a dignity-based theory of
human rights is ... : what accounts for the human dignity, and hence the human
rights, of those human beings who are not capable of functioning as persons?" Nich-
olas Wolterstorff, Book Review, 122 ETHICS 602, 607 (2012).
99 "Roughly speaking, formal freedom is said to be achieved through the rule of
law and the safeguarding of people's rights of property and contract; by contrast,
substantive or effective or real freedom is said to exist only when people possess the
material means necessary to realize their plans." Carter, The Myth, supra note 78, at
486 (footnote omitted). See RAwLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 179;
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE 265 (1985); R. George Wright, Consent-
ing Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1397, 1431 (1995) [hereinafter, Wright, Consenting Adults].
100 "[T]he seven conditions for autonomy are epistemic competence, rationality,
procedural independence, self-respect, control, access to a range of relevant options,
and substantive independence." OSHANA, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 27, at 87
(emphasis omitted). For a prior, shorter list, see Marina A.L. Oshana, Personal Auton-
omy and Society, 29 J. Soc. PHIL. 81, 93-94 (1998).
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within social norms, but the concomitants of wealth or status deter
or proscribe them. As a practical matter, external resources, like ca-
pabilities, would seem to be continuously additive. The more a per-
son's outside resources, the larger her material autonomy space, in
general.
To be a truly, materially autonomous person requires a certain
level of external resources.101 A homeless person without any re-
sources is autonomous in a weak sense only.102 These requisite re-
sources have been called "enablements", "primary goods", or
"functionings", among other labels. 103 External resource enable-
ments necessary to truly exercise one's autonomy space vary ac-
cording to a person's capabilities (e.g., intelligence, strength, health)
and environment (war, high crime area, agricultural community,
101 "From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the digni-
ty and well-being of all persons within its borders." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
264-65 (1970). "Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community." Id. at 265. See ALAN BRUDNER,
PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM xvii (2009); ONORA O'NEIL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 134
(2000); SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 10.
102 "Let them eat cake." "A homeless person sleeping under a bridge may have
chosen, in some sense, to do so; but we would not necessarily consider his choice to
be a free one." SANDEL, supra note 26, at 81.
103 Rawls, on the one hand, and Sen and Nussbaum on the other, have most fa-
mously directed attention to this issue. "Social primary goods are, according to
Rawls, those goods that anyone would want regardless of whatever else they want-
ed. They are means, or resources (broadly conceived) ...." Ingrid Robeyns & Harry
Brighouse, Introduction: Social Primary Goods and Capabilities as Metrics of Justice, in
MEASURING JUSTICE 1, 1 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns eds., 2010) (citing JOHN
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 58-61 (2001)). "The other approach,
developed most prominently by Amartya Sen, and more recently also by Martha
Nussbaum, is known as the capability approach. Instead of looking a people's hold-
ings of, or prospects for holding, external goods, we look at what kinds of function-
ings they are able to achieve." Id. at 2. See, e.g., SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra
note 14, at 73-74; SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 231-35, 253-68. For an
argument that the differences between these two approaches is overstated, see
Pogge, supra note 92, at 17. These general metrics have also been referred to as "capa-
bilities", but I reserve this term for personal resources that do not have external ori-
gins, such as athleticism and judgment.
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climate, capitalism).1 0 4 For example, a hilly community with many
steps and few sidewalks would significantly limit the material au-
tonomy space of the physically challenged, but have little impact on
athletic, vigorous persons.
While Kant does not find in his principles a right to enable-
ments or, more particularly, welfare, 105 he has been read as calling
for such a right.10 6 Even John Locke, a mainstay of libertarian phi-
losophers, can be read as a champion of some enablements. 10 7 Frie-
drich Hayek, another mainstay, is explicit about it.108 Among mod-
ern commentators, enablements or related metrics of one sort or
another are advanced by John Rawls, 109 Joel Feinberg, 110 Ronald
104 See, e.g., SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 254-57; MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 34445 (2004)
(referring to inner and outer aspects of capabilities).
105 Under Kant, "Itihe poor are supported not because they hold a right but be-
cause they are the beneficiaries of a duty. The sovereign takes over from the people
the duty to support the poor that is an incident of everyone's obligatory entrance
into a civil condition." Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of
Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 818 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib, Property and
Poverty]. See RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 25-26, 267-99.
106 See MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 12, at 124-25; ONORA
O'NEILL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 140 (2000); RUTH J. SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION 57 (2003);
WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 24, at 193-205.
107 Hausman, unlike some others, "takes] Locke to be concerned with the whole
gamut of threats to life, property, and freedom.... [I]f individuals cannot protect
themselves and government action is not itself a greater threat than the problem it
aims to tackle, then government should act." Daniel M. Hausman, A Lockean Argu-
ment for Universal Access to Health Care, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 166, 173 (Summer 2011).
"The Lockean is concerned with the protection of property broadly conceived and
with freedom in the sense of independence and self-determination." Id. at 186.
108 Hayek argues that a state guarantee of a minimum of sustenance need not "en-
danger[] general freedom", nor need a state protection against "those common haz-
ards or life against which ... few individuals can make adequate provision ... as in
the case of sickness and accident .... [Tihe case for the state's helping to organize a
comprehensive system of social insurance is very strong . FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK,
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 120-21 (1944) (quoted in Elizabeth Anderson, How Should
Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. 239, 258 (2009) (including
other cites to Hayek)).
109 In the revised edition of his seminal treatise, Rawls writes, "Primary goods are
now characterized as what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens,
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Dworkin,' Amartya Sen,11 2 Martha Nussbaum," 3 Joseph Raz, u4
and many others."15
Environment, both natural and social, is a third factor impact-
ing autonomy space. The environment provides a setting for an
agent's exercise of freedom. It affects the manner and degree to
which an agent's capabilities and resources allow her the liberty to
choose and act. It impacts her security. With respect to the natural
environment, the capabilities and external resources facilitating lib-
erty and security are different on the savanna than in the arctic or
desert. These include such things as toleration of heat or cold, ath-
leticism, and natural immunity or resistance to an endemic, debili-
and as normally and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life."
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at xiii. "[Tihe principle [of redress] holds
that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity,
society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born
into the less favorable social positions." Id. at 86. See JOHN RAWLS, Social Utility and
Primary Goods, in COLLECTED PAPERS 359, 370 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
no0 See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 37-38, 206-07.
111 "[I]mpersonal resources, consist in [a person's] wealth, measured as abstractly
as possible.... We must aim, as a first approximation, to make members of our politi-
cal community equal in those material resources." DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR
HEDGEHOGS, supra note 90, at 355.
112 See, e.g., SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 231-35, 254-57, 296-309.
113 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 53 (discussing capabili-
ties at 20-28 and listing "ten Central Capabilities" at 33-34); MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000) (listing
basic capabilities at 78-80); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997).
114 Raz advances the Basic-Capacities Principle that "requires us to promote condi-
tions in which people have the basic capacities for pursuit of goals and relationships
of sufficient range to make for a rewarding and fulfilling life." JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 16-17 (rev. ed. 1994). See id. at 3-28.
115 See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING (1986); SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE,
supra note 99 at, 158-83; Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS
287 (1999); Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J.
91, 128 (1995); Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 99, at 1427.
Enablements may spring from principles of distributive justice. See EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 33, at 266-67; Weinrib, Poverty and Property, supra note 105,
at 796; Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J.
JURIs. 143, 165-66 (2002).
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tating disease. 116 The social environment is also crucial.1 7 The capa-
bilities and external resources facilitating liberty and security are
different in a poor, oppressive, totalitarian plutocracy than in a
prosperous, capitalistic, liberal democracy. The liberty furthered by
a particular income or skill set depends on the costs of goods, the
(economic) usefulness of the skills, the number of others with simi-
lar or better skills, etc. Particular social environmental autonomy
space constraints may not be deontologically justifiable, or con-
sistent with other, basic, accepted norms. For example, a maxim
generally disallowing the liberty to engage in fair competition is
hardly plausible, 18 as is the case for proscribing accidental bumps
into others in crowded public spaces. On the other hand, deontical-
ly unacceptable would be disrespectful discrimination, such as sex-
ism and racism, or the imposition of nonconsensual duties due en-
tirely to involuntary group membership, such as that of caste or
national origin. When provision is feasible," 9 the absence or denial
of some standard protections and enablements, such as policing or
adequate schools, seems unjustifiable.
116 The stock example is the resistance to malaria provided by the gene causing
sickle-cells, which is disadvantageous overall outside malarial zones. On a personal
note, during my Peace Corps tour in Nepal in the 60's, I was stationed in the Terai,
the flat, fertile, Gangetic plain bordering India, living along a rather unsophisticated
tribe that was said to have a natural resistance or tolerance of malaria. A few years
before I arrived, a USAID program had greatly reduced the threat of malaria with
DDT spraying. During my stay I was told that the local tribe was being increasingly
exploited by the savvier "hill Nepalis" and Indians who were now freer to "invade"
without the deadly mosquito to keep them at bay.
117 "[O]ne has to be lucky in the match of one's talents with socially available
forms of activity." BARBARA HERMAN, MORAL LITERACY 269 (2007). See T.M.
SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 292 (2000).
118 "That inevitable kind of harm to others is, as the old Roman lawyers put it,
damnum sine injuria. It is part of our personal responsibility - it is what makes our
separate responsibilities personal - that we accept the inevitability and permissibility
of competition harm." DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 90, at 288.
119 Feasibility is important. As Rawls notes, "most such principles [of justice] are
only as a prima facie principle, one that is to be weighed in the balance with others."
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 86.
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Ultimately, capabilities, external resources, and the environ-
ment interrelate, perhaps synergistically, in creating and delineat-
ing one's actual, material autonomy space. In light of the spatial
metaphor of autonomy space, it might be modeled in this way. Au-
tonomy space can be visualized as a multidimensional, ameba-
shaped form with chunks cut from the edges, representing external
limitations, and holes or gaps on the inside, representing internal
limitations.120
C. TYPES OF AUTONOMY SPACE
Theory must ultimately accommodate practical realities. 121 For
this topic they include the many different sorts of environmental
circumstances that humans face, and the wide range of their capa-
bilities and external resources with which they have to face them.
Consequently, autonomy space is not truly the same for everyone
even if they are subject to an identical set of deontic maxims. In the
last section above, this divergence suggests that the duty to respect
others may imply or support a redistributive maxim aimed at assur-
ing everyone a certain minimum expanse of autonomy space.122
Otherwise, do they truly have freedom? In this section I further de-
velop some of the observations by discussing three ways of looking
at, or three types of, autonomy space: hypothetical, formal, and ma-
terial.' 23 These types of autonomy space become particularly rele-
120 Pushing this metaphor further, the internal and external autonomy limitations
may not be complete gaps or holes, but rather thinned areas within the "substance"
of autonomy. For example, "irresistible impulse" would be represented by an inter-
nal gap, whereas "hard-to-resist impulse" thins the autonomy space at that place,
i.e., the agent has some power to overcome the impulse but not unhindered freedom.
As the impulse becomes easier to resist, until it dissipates altogether, the autonomy
"substance" thickens in that metaphorical area.
121 Kant was aware of this. See KANT, ON THE COMMON SAYING, supra note 61, at
273.
122 A welfare maxim may be seen as creating a positive right. See supra note 54.
123 Compare Brudner's trichotomy of formal agency, real autonomy, and commu-
nity belonging. See BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM, supra note 101, at 5-6.
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vant in establishing requitals for invasions. Which autonomy space
is to be protected?
Hypothetical autonomy space suggests an ideal.1 24 A person
must have extensive physical and mental capabilities to meet this
standard. For guidance, we may look to the ideal rational person
sometimes central to particular moral,125 political,126 or economic
theory.127 As for this person's external resources, while not a Bill
Gates or a Warren Buffett, she has enough of them to engage fully
in the activities of public and private life, whatever her sensible de-
sires .128
The natural and social environment supporting hypothetical
autonomy space cannot be specified in detail. Eden is not required.
124 "[W]e can distinguish between 'basic' autonomy - a certain level of self-
government necessary to secure one's status as a moral agent or political subject -
and 'ideal' autonomy - the level or kind of self-direction that serves as a regulative
idea .... John Christman & Joel Anderson, Introduction, in AUTONOMY AND THE
CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM 1, 2 (John Christman & Joel Anderson eds., 2005).
12 Parfit, as usual, offers an interesting analysis of rationality. See PARFIT, ON
WHAT MATTERS, supra note 23, at 111-29.
126 Rawls invokes the standard concept of rationality, less envy, "familiar in social
theory." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 124 (footnote omitted). With a
"coherent set of preferences between the options open to him," the rational person
"ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the
plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater
chance of being successfully executed." Id. See generally KEN BINMORE, RATIONAL
DECISIONS (2009); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993); RATIONAL
CHOICE (Jon Elster ed., 1986); RATIONAL DECISION (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1964).
127 "[Tlhe concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the nar-
row sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given
ends." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12 (modifying this sense for his
own purposes). See, e.g., I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS ch. II (2d
ed. 1957). See generally RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987); THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds.,
2005).
128 Cf. supra note 103 (discussing social primary goods and capabilities or function-
ings).
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Human characteristics must be kept in mind.129 For those of us ha-
bituated to temperate climates, it is hard to imagine longing for a
severe desert or frozen wasteland, but many people do quite well in
such places and may feel disoriented elsewhere. Still, I do not think
that we should take the biota, climate, geography, and other native
features of a person's surroundings as a given. An ideal place to
exercise one's autonomy would not require undue time and effort
to satisfy basic needs. Beyond meeting basic needs, the environment
must allow for additional time and resources for easily preserving
one's security and utilizing one's liberty to engage in preferred en-
deavors.130 Perhaps you found such a place during a vacation - a
short one, most likely, that ended before the bug or rainy season.
What is the social environment of your Shangri-La? We cannot take
as benchmarks the actual norms of one's familial, community, reli-
gious, political, and economic institutions.13' For one, some such
norms may not be deontically justifiable, as in a sexist society. Even
if a society springs from a strong social contract, one in which the
members deeply consent to its terms, we must still reject any of the
norms that violate the categorical imperative, as where, according
to Kant, consensual mutilation or slavery is declared acceptable.132
Formal autonomy space is a default standard within a society
that substantially satisfies the requirements of the categorical im-
perative. Each person is presumed to meet, and usually held to, a
129 See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 31, at 190 (discussing the contin-
gency of law and morality on human vulnerability).
130 One's preferences are, of course, partially informed by the environment in
which one is raised. As this again shows, it is not possible to break up this puzzle of
autonomy into totally independent pieces.
131 For Rawls, the parties in the original position behind the veil of ignorance "do
not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not
know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has
been able to achieve." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 118.
132 See supra note 61.
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minimum standard of capabilities. 133 In the common law, this is
said to be those of the reasonable person. Her relevant characteris-
tics are: "Normal intelligence; normal perception, memory, and at
least a minimum of standard knowledge .... 134 This existing stand-
ard may not suffice for our purposes insofar as it incorporates char-
acteristics that do not align with deontic mandates. When, for in-
stance, a reasonable person is said to have "knowledge" that certain
classes of persons have particular inferior skills (e.g., sexism, rac-
ism), we must exclude as disrespectful these characteristics from
our understanding of formal autonomy space.135 The external re-
sources assumed by formal autonomy space, like that of the law's
reasonable person, are enough for a person to engage in normal
quotidian activities and meet her usual moral and legal duties. 136
Her resources are not so limited that she feels compelled to engage
133 In other words, a person is presumed to have the skill set needed to reasonably
exercise her rights and meet her duties, such as in avoiding negligence and satisfying
familial and other obligations. The usual exceptions for children and mental incom-
petents apply in the law and under deontic principles. "The elements of character of
a normal moral agent will not be the same across times and places, but the feature of
fit is constant: hers is the character that is at home in her social world." HERMAN,
MORAL LITERACY, supra note 117, at 305 n.8.
134 DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 280 (format revised and footnotes omit-
ted). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 7,
at 173-93. Dobbs also adds characteristics not applicable to formal autonomy space,
but suggestive of material autonomy: "all the additional intelligence, skill, or
knowledge actually possessed by the individual actor; and the physical attributes of
the actor [her]self." Id. For doubts as to the usefulness of the reasonable person
standard in the context of copyright, see lrina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1303 (2012), and for doubts as to the tort standard as "an empirically ob-
served practice or perception," see Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable
Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 323 (2012).
135 "Actually there are two kinds of 'objective' standards sometimes used by
courts: appeal to the judgments or characteristics of most people or the average per-
son, on the one hand, and appeal to an ideal reasonable person, on the other."
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 210.
136 For example, the reasonable person is presumed to have the resources needed
to meet the ordinary standard of care. See Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Peterson, 69
P. 578 (Colo. 1902) (Otherwise, "if [the defendant] were extremely poor, the care
required might be such as practically to amount to nothing .... ).
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in high-risk activities or consent to severe contracts. She possesses
sufficient enablements. Yet she may fall short of the resources need-
ed to do all that she would sensibly wish, such as to fully engage in
civic life by running for public office.
The natural and social environment framing formal autonomy
space, like the requisites of capabilities and external resources, al-
low a person to engage in normal daily life. Social prejudice, for
one, is not unduly disabling, nor are the demands of a rigid reli-
gious ethos unduly constricting. Under the existing common and
criminal laws, formal autonomy space, perhaps with some nonde-
ontic elements, is usually the default standard.
Material autonomy space acknowledges the characteristics and
circumstances of the particular agent in question. One's actual ca-
pabilities, such as intelligence and willpower, whether above or
below average, are the given. Circumstances may determine the
extent to which a person's actual capabilities suffice to exercise her
liberty or protect her security. 37 For instance, ectomorphic geniuses
may be disadvantaged in a strict, violent, subsistence society, while
137 For instance, in exercising her liberty, a child may be able to truly consent to
some choices (e.g., fruit for dessert, not pie), but not others (e.g., employment con-
tract). John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHIcS OF CONSENT 3, 13 (Franklin
G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26,
at 116 (observing that some voluntary choices can be made by animals, small chil-
dren, and mentally disabled patients). The minimally competent person, though de
jure autonomous, "may rule himself badly, unwisely, only partially. He may in fact
have relatively little personal autonomy in the sense of defacto condition ..... Id. at
30. Feinberg diagrams "[die facto and de jure senses of autonomy, liberty, and free-
dom," zd. at 65 (diagram 19-1). Along these lines, Kolber identifies "liberty-in-fact"
that "focuses on our ability to take certain actions without interference with others."
Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1587
(2009) (footnote omitted). "[Pleople differ dramatically in the amount of liberty that
they have in their baseline conditions because people differ in the amount that others
in fact interfere with their available action." Id. Kolber distinguishes this view of
liberty from "liberties-under-law" which is suggestive of what I identify as formal
autonomy space. See id. at 1589. He further identifies "idealized liberties" that "are
those that we ought to have under some set of idealized circumstances." Id. at 1593.
This seems to map onto my notion of hypothetical autonomy space.
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mesomorphic dullards thrive. Likewise for external resources, one's
actual resources are taken as the given. A person may have the hy-
pothetical or formal autonomy space (liberty) to buy a yacht, but
not the economic wherewithal. For the same reason, she may have a
duty of care (e.g., to support her children) that cannot be met, or
leaves her in desperate straits. Finally, the particular agent's actual
natural and social environment, normative and otherwise, frames
her material autonomy space.
In sum, material autonomy space refers to the realizable power
of a person to exercise and protect her hypothetical or formal au-
tonomy space. Hence, the material autonomy space of a wealthy,
talented, unencumbered person surpasses that of her formal auton-
omy space. It may approach, even exceed, that of her hypothetical
autonomy space. For those at the other end of spectrum, their mate-
rial autonomy space may be minuscule, ultimately, a dot.
As the discussion of these three types of autonomy space re-
veals, it is difficult to sharply distinguish one from another. The
discussion also shows that a person's capabilities, external re-
sources, and environment interrelate in complex ways. These com-
plications may especially hang over plausible requital maxims. For
example, if a person is wrongfully denied the right to purchase a
yacht, should a requital account for the reality that she did not have
the material autonomy space, the resources, to purchase it anyway?
The common law of negligence aims to return an invadee to her ex
ante position.138 This position is based on her actual, material condi-
tion, not her formal autonomy space. This benefits an invadee with
unusual, unforeseeable vulnerabilities, but it disadvantages the in-
vader who is held responsible for costly consequences that she
could not foresee. 139 Negligence requital maxims that base the re-
medial standard on formal autonomy space may protect the invad-
138 See, e.g., DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 1047.
139 See discussion infra Part VIA. (Responsibility Blameworthiness).
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er reasonably ignorant of the invadee's unusual vulnerabilities from
the consequences of her choices and actions that were not fully re-
sponsible. She is liable for the harms that a "reasonable person"
would have suffered, but not the more extensive harms that the ac-
tual invadee suffered. But then the compensated invadee is left
short of her ex ante position. And if recovery is based on the "rea-
sonable person" invadee when the actual invadee was harmed less
than what was foreseeable, the invader must "overcompensate" the
invadee. Which standard is fairer, more just? Do either or both of
them meet the minimal, formal requirements of the categorical im-
perative? What about other possible requitals? As a final example,
when determining an apt retributive punishment for a criminal act,
should an agent's formal or material autonomy space be propor-
tionately truncated? For the severely penurious criminal, prison
may offer more benefits to her than does the outside world. For the
rich and famous, even a moment in prison may be devastating.
Should this be relevant?
D. THE DECLINING MARGINAL INCREASE OF AUTONOMY SPACE
Parallel to the economic notion of wealth, there seems to be a
declining marginal increase of autonomy space with expansions of
capabilities and resources, and relaxations of environmental con-
straints. Facilitated liberty and security expand at a decreasing
marginal rate. If one has a small material autonomy space, a partic-
ular invasion (say, a loss of $1000) has a greater effect than when
one has a larger autonomy space.140 But this is a generalization only,
as in counterexamples in which being slightly better than others can
lead to enormous gains.141
140 See Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 137, at 1599 n.88.
141 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL
SOCIETY (1995).
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The economic notion of the declining marginal utility of wealth
may largely get to the same place as the idea of marginal changes in
autonomy space.142 Insofar as economists posit that everything can
be priced, then wealth suggests autonomy space. Progressive taxa-
tion may be supported, then, by the declining marginal increase of
autonomy space as well as of the declining utility of wealth. But
wealth may not equate to the liberty and security freedoms within
autonomy space. In an environment in which wealth per se is not
valued or is actually disvalued (e.g., a religious community re-
nouncing materialism), changes in wealth would diverge from
changes in autonomy space. Similarly, for a person without access
to markets, such as an isolated prisoner or recluse, wealth may be
useless as a practical matter.
The concept of the declining marginal increase of autonomy
space implies that the material autonomy space loss to an invadee
may differ from a like gain to the invader. The rich invadee may
lose less autonomy space from a $100 theft than the poor invader
gains by it. Requitals for autonomy space invasions also present this
asymmetrical phenomenon. After compensation for a tort, such as a
battery, the defendant's autonomy space may shrink more or less
than the plaintiff's autonomy space then enlarges. Cognitive scien-
tists find that autonomy space losses are felt more than equal
gains.143 Even after a simple wealth transfer between two equally
142 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 1977).
Cf. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 254 (1987) (applying "the principle of
diminishing marginal returns" to the damages from a series of misrepresentations);
Robert H. Frank, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832, 1832 (1997)
("Does consuming more goods make people happier? For a broad spectrum of
goods, available evidence suggests that beyond some point the answer is essentially
no.").
143 See, e.g., JONAH LEHRER, How WE DECIDE 70-81 (2009); Daniel Kahneman, Jack
L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 55, 56-57, 72 (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIOR LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 5-6 (C.R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Con-
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situated parties (i.e., equal material autonomy spaces), there is an
asymmetry in the effects since one suffers a loss while the other ob-
tains a gain. Typically, the loss has a greater felt impact.144 A bottom
line is that pure wealth-transfer-type requitals for autonomy space
invasions, and other types of requitals as well, if designed to re-
balance or equalize the invader's compensatory obligation or pun-
ishment and the invadee's harms, may not restore their relative or
absolute autonomy spaces. Much depends on the prior baselines of
the two parties, among other things.
IV. AUTONOMY SPACE BOUNDARIES
Rights and duties are a reflection of an agent's autonomy space,
or vice versa. Within the boundaries of her space, the agent has
rights against potential invaders. Outside her boundaries, she has
duties not to invade the autonomy spaces of other agents. This sec-
tion further examines where and how these boundaries are erected.
It begins by looking at traditional boundary baselines and then
turns to the individualized deontic process of delineating boundary
markers.
A. TRADITIONAL BASELINES
A harm principle is the classic boundary marker demarcating
baseline autonomy space. The best-known harm principle is J.S.
Mill's: self-regarding harm falls within the range of personal free-
doms and, hence, is not subject to governmental intervention, while
other-regarding harm may be subject to regulation.145
flict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 473, 481-86
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
144 This may also be the case at an initial invasion. If, say, an invader steals $100,
the invadee feels it as a loss while the invader feels it as a gain.
145 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, supra note 31, at 81, 176-200. As a utilitarian, Mill
based his harm principle on the argument that the liberty it allows will increase
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For self-regarding harm, the claim in deontic terms is that be-
cause such harm does not wrongfully harm another person, there is
no violation of any duty to others.146 Harming oneself is not disre-
spectful of others. Self-regarding harm may be self-disrespectful
and therefore violate a duty to oneself, as in certain suicides,147 but
it does not, by itself, violate a duty to other persons. In these cir-
cumstances others must defer to the agent's choice.
Other-regarding harm may or may not be wrongful.1 48 Under
existing law, harms from fair competition and "pure accident", for
example, are not remediable, rightfully so in the view of most.149
overall social utility. See id. Feinberg specifies a harm principle: "It is always a good
reason in support of penal legislation that it would be effective in preventing (elimi-
nating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from act-
ing) and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other
values." FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 26. For nine "commonly pro-
posed liberty-limiting principles", see id. at 10-14, 26-27. Sadurski sees Rawls's deep
principle of the "priority of the right over the good" as "merely a restatement of the
[Millian] 'harm principle'." Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and the Problem of Pun-
ishment, 25 ISR. L. REV. 302, 328 (1991) (referring to JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
393 (rev. ed. 1999)). "There is significant controversy within the philosophical litera-
ture both as to how to understand the Harm Principle (What is to count as a harm?
Do offensive actions count as harms under this standard?), and as to the merits of
that principle." Brian H. Bix, Theories of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morali-
ty: Comments on Charles Fried, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 725 (2012) (footnote omit-
ted). For the applicability of the harm principle to contract law, and surrounding
controversies, see id. at 725-33.
146 That self-regarding harm may merge into other-regarding harm, see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 263 (1978); Morgan, The Mode and Limits of John
Stuart Mill's Toleration, supra note 31, at 147-50.
147 Kant insists that the categorical imperative requires one to be respectful of
one's own self as well as others. This disallows, in his view, slavery contracts, self-
mutilation, and, perhaps, certain consensual sexual conduct, among other things. See
supra note 61.
148 "[T]he harm principle sets but a threshold of legitimacy for the use of state pow-
er. It sets a necessary condition, not one that is necessary and sufficient." Dori Kimel,
Fault and Harm in Breach of Contract, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 271, 282
(Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010).
149 Utilitarian economists favoring strict enterprise liability may disagree with re-
spect to "pure accident". Certainly they would not disagree about fair competition.
That a deontological libertarian may have difficulty justifying the harms from fair
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Psychic harms pose some of the most difficult issues for boundary
marking. While some conduct may psychically harm others be-
cause, say, they are upset from simply being aware of it (e.g., par-
ticular private sexual activities), such "knowledge" harm need not
be deontically wrongful. The agent usually is not disrespecting the
objectors. She is not using them as a means only. 50 She is not inter-
fering with their liberty or truncating their rightful security. Though
one generally has a security interest in avoiding psychic harms from
the conduct of others, this must be carefully circumscribed, for oth-
erwise, near the bottom of this slippery slope, are claims such as,
"Your legitimate, earned success has aroused painful envy in me
and therefor has wrongfully harmed me." A proscriptive maxim on
these grounds would strike a balance between liberty and security
that unduly favors psychic security. Nonetheless, adopting a proper
balance is quite difficult. 151 The central deontic pillar of respect for
the dignity of moral persons helps to point a way out of this com-
plexity.1 52 Psychic harm of others is wrongful if it arises from con-
economic competition, see Jonathan Wolff, Libertarianism, Utility, and Economic Com-
petition, 92 VA. L. REV. 1605 (2006).
1-10 "In general, using another as a mere means is thought to belong in the same
family as the concepts of 'manipulation, dehumanization, exploitation, and disre-
spect.' [It] may also be understood in the negative - as failing to respect another's
inviolability, rationality, or moral status." Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retribu-
tivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 927 (2002) (footnotes
omitted). "In addition to using another as a tool or commodity, using another with-
out their consent is another common conception of using someone as a mere means."
Id. at 928 (footnote omitted). For various viewpoints, see id. at 927-30. Parfit analyzes
the "Mere Means Principle", and finds it defective. See PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS,
supra note 23, at 212-32.
151 "The harm principle is designed to draw the boundaries of criminal liability ...
[but] the resulting boundary is vague, elastic, and porous." Meir Dan-Cohen, Think-
ing Criminal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2419, 2421 (2007). For summaries of suggested
considerations when drawing boundary lines, see FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra
note 30, at 214-17, 243-45.
152 Because of "a growing disaffection with the harm principle [such as its expan-
siveness] and the challenge of multiculturalism," Dan-Cohen advances a "dignity
principle". DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS, supra note 21 at 152-53. Similarly,
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duct primarily disrespectful of them, but not otherwise, even if said
to be self-disrespectful. Under this line drawing, private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is not disrespectful of others if
engaged in for personal reasons, but is disrespectful if motivated by
the desire to noisily upset knowing neighbors.1 53 This may be gen-
eralized to public events. If public conduct is engaged in, say, to
express pride in one's characteristics or values (e.g., gay pride) or to
assert one's liberty claims (e.g., civil rights), then it is not disrespect-
ful of others. If the conduct is primarily aimed at vexing others, it is
disrespectful. 1 54
B. BOUNDARY MARKERS
Other-regarding wrongful harms are established by deontic
maxims. An agent, by adopting a maxim, demarcates an autonomy
"Michael Kohler has argued that the entire criminal law should be understood as a
response to a violation of the victim's freedom." FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 57, at 41 (footnote omitted).
153 Compare Kant's requirement that duty is to be done for duty's sake, and if
done for mixed motives, that the duty motive predominate. See, e.g., KORSGAARD,
CREATING THE KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 55-67; PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, supra
note 23, at 169-79;WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 24, at 24-42. Compare also the
standard in common law nuisance law whereby a fence built for the landowner's
reasonable use is not a nuisance, but a similar spite fence is. See DOBBS, LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 63, at 1329; KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 624 n.65.
154 Since motive or purpose for the offensive conduct is central to the line drawn,
this differs from Feinberg's Offense Principle: "It is always a good reason in support
of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is necessary to prevent serious offense to
persons other than the actor and would be an effective means to that end if enacted."
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 26. "There is one kind of offended state
that can probably never satisfy this requirement [of proscription], namely the shock
of disappointment occasioned by the bare knowledge that other persons are doing,
or may be doing, immoral things in private with legal impunity." Id. at 50. For criti-
cism of Feinberg's line drawing, see, e.g., FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 57, at 185; Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 815, 858-64 Uules
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Larry Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality, 7
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1994); David W. Shoemaker, "Dirty Words" and the
Offense Principle, 19 LAW & PHIL. 545 (2000).
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space boundary between herself and others. Subject to later bound-
ary adjustments through consent, crossing this marker constitutes,
as the agent sees it, a wrongful harm. If another person crosses the
marker, he wrongfully harms the agent. If the agent crosses her
own adopted marker, she wrongfully harms another person.
Whether this other person perceives his harm from the agent as
wrongful depends on whether he has adopted a comparable max-
im. The harm may be wrongful from the actor's perspective but
nonwrongful from the other's perspective, and vice versa. For ex-
ample, one person may adopt a battery maxim that disallows non-
consensual touchings of items physically connected to a person
(e.g., a worn hat), while another person may adopt a battery maxim
that also disallows touchings of closely associated items (e.g., a car
in which a person is riding).5 5 This signals practical trouble in the
individualistic world supposed here. Some of these potential con-
flicts may be ameliorated by higher order maxims, as where an
agent adopts a maxim to follow respectful social norms. But sooner
or later the complexities of an individualized deontic realm must be
confronted.
In principle, a person cannot rationally adopt a set of maxims
that create inconsistent boundary markers. Prima facie or pro tanto
rights and duties may conflict, 156 but individual maxims explicitly
or implicitly include "except when ..." or "unless ..." clauses and
155 See DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 61-62 ("extended personality");
KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 39-40.
156 That Kant did not work out well the problem of conflicting moral norms, see
SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 73-74. When apparent
obligations conflict, Kant would have the agent rely on her judgment to resolve the
problem by adopting a responsive maxim. See Mark D. White, Pro Tanto Retributiv-
ism: Judgment and the Balance of Principles in Criminal Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM 129,
135-37 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (comparing this approach to those of W.D. Ross
and Ronald Dworkin). On the "pro tanto view of promissory obligation," see Ha-
noch Sheinman, Introduction: Promises and Agreements, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS
3, 17-19 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011).
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other provisos that coherently weave together the set of maxims. 157
For example, an agent who disappoints another's aroused expecta-
tions ("I promise to meet you at 1:00, on the dot.") in order to effect
an easy rescue would not be violating her apparent maxims against
such disappointment if her promisekeeping, reliance, or expectation
maxims (implicitly) include the proviso, "except when necessary to
make an easy rescue." 158
There are many exception provisos in broad or general maxims.
One must not equate generalization with the universalization de-
manded by the categorical imperative. 159 A universalized maxim
may apply to a restricted range of persons (e.g., spouses), or a nar-
row range of circumstances (e.g., ballooning).160 There may be an
151 "A rule that ends with the word 'unless ... ' is still a rule." H.L.A. HART,
CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (1961). "Hart claimed that the unless-clause cannot be exhaust-
ively stated: no matter how many exceptions are given to a rule, one can always
imagine further exceptions that have not been captured." Richard Holton, The Excep-
tion Proves the Rule, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 369, 375 (2010). For an argument that exceptions
to rules, i.e., subrules, effectively converts rules into rules of thumb, see Allen Habib,
Promises, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/promises/ (last visited Aug. 7,
2013).
1- "Immanuel Kant argued that failing to rescue others violated the categorical
imperative." George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, I BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 275, 291 (1998) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK TO THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 17-22 (Herbert J. Paton trans., 1962)). This is not to say that there is a legal
duty to rescue. See id. at 293.
159 Parfit finds flaws in Kant's universalization principle. See PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATFERS, supra note 23, at 275-419. Indeed, in his two-volume tome, Parfit finds
flaws in virtually all of Kant's principles, though he tweaks them to make them, in
his view, plausible and useful. In particular, see PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, supra
note 23, at 652-718.
'6 See, e.g., PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, supra note 23, at 315. "Principles of action
- practical principles - refer to types ofaction .... [Plractical principles usually specify
the domain of agents for whom they are to be regarded as relevant." ONORA O'NEIL,
BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 51 (2000). In terms of equal treatment, "[wihat we actually mean
when we speak of equality in a certain legal system is that we accept the choice of
particular properties as relevant to differentiated treatment." SADURSKI, GIVING
DESERT ITS DUE, supra note 99, at 82. "[N]o objective and non-controversial standard
of 'relevance' can be found." Id. (footnote omitted). "The reasonableness of the choice
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enormous number of exceptions to broad maxims as the seemingly
infinite nuances of possible circumstances and interweavings
among maxims play out.161 While Kant has been incorrectly accused
of being an absolutist about unqualifiable rules, 1 62 nonetheless, most
people would create exceptions to broad maxims, as in the rescue
example above. Indeed, a person who passed up an easy rescue in
order to keep a nonessential promise would probably be considered
a moral monster.163 If an agent chooses a set of maxims that fails to
account for potential conflicts, the set is irrational in the sense of not
being complete and coherent1 64 To remedy this, an agent might
of certain criteria for classification of people by legal rules rests upon value judg-
ments .... " Id. at 83. Nonetheless, an overarching principle of equality demands
"equal respect for all human beings and equal concern for them, irrespective of their
qualities and characteristics." Id. at 96.
161 "How many valid moral principles are there, then? An indefinite number, I
would say." SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 117, at 201.
162 "The notion that Kantian ethics is committed to strict exceptionless rules be-
cause it regards moral principles as categorical imperatives is based on the crudest
misunderstanding. A categorical imperative.., is far from implying that the obliga-
toriness of particular moral rules or duties is unconditional." WOOD, KANTIAN
ETHICS, supra note 22, at 63. Under Kant, reasons for exceptions cannot "always be
formulated in precise rules, telling us in general terms precisely when to make ex-
ceptions. Judgment in Kant's view is a talent that may be developed through experi-
ence but cannot be formulated in any set of rules." Id. On the other hand, Hill main-
tains, "unconditional prohibitions ... do not follow from Kant's basic moral theory,
despite what he himself thought ... THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Introduction, in RESPECT,
PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE 1, 3 (2000).
163 In discussing the failure of a person to easily rescue a child at dire risk, one
court observed, "If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage
and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or indicta-
ble under the statute for its death." Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H.
1897). "Saying 'I promise to ... ' normally binds one to do the thing promised, but it
does not bind unconditionally or absolutely .... [Ilt does not bind one to do the thing
promised whatever the cost to oneself and others." Thomas Scanlon, Promises and
Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119, 214 (1990).
164 "A collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable." KANT, THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS, supra note 20, at 379. There may be slippery slopes if one insists on nar-
row maxims to account for potential conflicts with other maxims. "If... we concen-
trate upon the details of each case and allow maxims to be quite specific, then it
seems we can will as universal law the maxim of virtually any act that we are willing
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adopt higher levels of meta-maxims to deal with incompleteness or
prima facie conflicts within her set of explicit, lower-level max-
ims. 165
to do." HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 20, at 62. Well, not
quite. We cannot will a maxim disrespectful of others. This is limitation enough. In
addressing the problem of "adjust[ing] our ethical categories and principles recipro-
cally until we get whatever result we want," Korsgaard observes, "Of course there
are dangers of this kind, but it is not clear that we have any option but to face them,
and to try to be intellectually honest." KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM, supra
note 31, at 357-58. "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of .... I ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 3, in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 936 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). The idea of specify-
ing a complete and coherent set of rights "all the way down" has been referred to as
"specificationism". Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights (last visited Aug. 7,
2013) (citing Russ Shafer-Landau, Specifying Absolute Rights, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 209
(1995) ("[Elach right is defined by an elaborate set of qualifications that specify when
it does and when it does not apply: a set of qualifications that define the right's
'space.'")). Objections to specificationism are: fully specified rights are unknowable;
they are conclusory; and, they cannot explain the "residue" of a "defeated" right, as
where a starving person may have a right to steal food, but still has a duty to, say,
apologize for it. See Wenar, supra. For the last objection, we could say that there is no
such right to steal, but that the requital maxim for a violation requires, under the
circumstances, only an apology. Specificationism supports "Kant's bold proclama-
tion that 'a conflict of duties is inconceivable."' Larry Alexander & Michael Moore,
Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/ethics-deontological/ (last
visited Aug. 7, 2013) (citation to Kant omitted). "[R]easons for believing it are diffi-
cult to produce." Id.
165 "[A] subject may have, in a rule he prescribes to himself, two grounds of obliga-
tion .... When two such grounds conflict with each other, practical philosophy says.
. . that the stronger ground of obligation prevails .... " KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS, supra note 20, at 379. See Russ Shafer-Landau, Specifying Absolute Rights, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (1995). This suggests Dworkin's controversial "right an-
swer" thesis. See RONALD DWORKJN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985). Chap-
man, discussing Frederick Schauer's and Ronald Dworkin's similar views, writes,
"the idea is that the rule, properly and completely articulated as a rule, must contain
all the various 'unless' clauses that are relevant to the application of the rule." Bruce
Chapman, Law Games: Defeasible Rules and Revisable Rationality, 17 LAW & PHIL. 443,
449 (1998) (footnote omitted). Without full specification prior to application, Schauer
argues, "there is essentially no rule." Id. (footnote omitted). On the other hand, Hill
observes, "the kingdom of ends ideal, like any rule-generating procedure, must face
the possibility that, in practice, it will produce moral dilemma, gaps, and disagree-
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In the real world, an agent rarely if ever expressly adopts max-
ims. Instead, she reveals or manifests chosen maxims and their nu-
ances by her conduct over time, if consistent, in response to newly
faced moral dilemmas. Maxims are adopted and refined piecemeal.
If asked, she may not know beforehand the details of her own max-
ims. 166 It may require the kiln of difficult dilemmas to harden her
considered or spontaneous choices. This is, in some ways, like the
common law at work. Consequently, when a person claims that an
agent has violated her own maxim and has therefore wrongfully
harmed him, and the agent denies that any of her maxims encom-
pass his claim, the claimant's response might be, "But your prior
conduct in response to a morally indistinguishable situation re-
vealed that you have adopted a maxim that would protect me from
your action." 167 How likely is it that the claimant will be able to as-
ments." THOMAS E. HILL, JR., A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, in RESPECT,
PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE 33, 52 (2000). "Given how limited and imprecisely specified
the commitments of Kantian legislators are, it seems obvious that some questions
about moral rules will not be determinately resolvable." Id. "For practical Kantians,
then, apparent dilemmas pose tasks for further moral thinking rather than a reason to
abandon the framework or simply to marvel at the tragic absurdity of life." Id. at 53.
Relatedly, Munzer advances this approach: "Morality may be composed of different
types of basic units - for instance, specific 'rules' that apply pretty rigidly to actions
they cover, together with broad 'principles' that exert less definitive force where they
apply." Stephen R. Munzer, Persons and Consequences: Observations on Fried's Right
and Wrong, 77 MICH. L. REV. 421, 427 (1970) (citing Marcus G. Singer, Moral Rules and
Principles, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 160 (A.I. Melden ed., 1958)). This is sug-
gestive of R.M. Hare's "two levels of moral thinking - intuitive and critical .... Criti-
cal thinking resolves conflicts [in intuitive principles] and in general tries to select the
best set of intuitive principles." Stephen R. Munzer, Intuition and Security in Moral
Philosophy, 82 MICH. L. REV. 740, 740 (1984) (reviewing R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING:
ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT (1981)).
166 While if pressed, an agent could normally state and justify the maxim under
which she is acting, "Kant does not claim that a rational agent either always does or
always must have an explicit maxim consciously in mind while acting." SULLIVAN,
IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 28.
167 "The most important of these factors which show that in acting we have ap-
plied a rule is that if our behaviour is challenged we are disposed to justify it by ref-
erence to the rule .... " HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 31, at 136. Evidence
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sert this? To confront this practical reality, we must invoke the state
or other authoritative sources to arbitrate many of these problems
in specifying a full set of enforceable maxims.16s
Once the parameters of an agent's autonomy space are specified
by her first-order, substantive maxims, requitals for wrongful in-
cursions into her or another's parallel space fall within conceptions
of corrective justice and retribution. An agent must choose second-
order, requital maxims as well as first-order ones. Requital maxims
must also satisfy the rationality standard of completeness and co-
herence, separately and in combination with the first-order maxims.
When an agent's own first- and second-order maxims call for her
requital, the agent has a deontic duty to meet the obligation. It is
disrespectful for an agent to invade another's autonomy space that
is established by the agent's own first-order maxim, and then de-
cline to adopt a responsive requital maxim or comply with it once
adopted. 169
V. HARM
Our moral agent is ready to establish the boundaries of her au-
tonomy space and, owing to the universalization mandate of the
categorical imperative, the boundaries of everyone else's autonomy
space, as she sees fit. She needs at this point to adopt a full set of
substantive and requital maxims that balance her interests in liberty
that we accept the rule "may be manifested not only in our past and subsequent
general acknowledgements of it and conformity to it, but in our criticism of our own
and others' deviation from it." Id.
168 "This mediation between freedom and security means that every actor must
accept a measure of external constraint, not precisely specified ex ante, on her
movements." Bernstein, supra note 33, at 737.
169 See Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1603, 1627-30 (2009) ("second-order moral responsibility"). Since promissory obliga-
tions stem from autonomous choice, "the remedial moral duties, if any, that attach to
the violation of those obligations should also be subject to the will of the individuals
who create the obligations." Id. at 1629-30 (footnote omitted). Are there requital max-
ims for violation of requital maxims? Third-order and higher maxims?
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and security. For this task she must develop a sense of the harms
caused by other persons that she would choose to be protected from
and, reciprocally, that she would disallow herself from inflicting on
others. The harms must survive the filter of the categorical impera-
tive, of course. Offense at a touching simply because it was by a
member of a disfavored, innate outgroup will not make it through
this filter. That would be disrespectful.
The most prominent definition of "harm" is by Joel Feinberg. A
"harm", in one sense, is a "setback to interests." 170 But there is
"harm" and there is "harm", 171 and there is "harm" and there is
"wrongful harm".' 72 For purposes of identifying relevant harms,' 7 3
170 "Feinberg expounds harm in three senses: (i) harm as damage, (ii) harm as a
setback to interests, and (iii) harm as wrongdoing. Harm as used in the harm princi-
ple is an amalgamation of sense two and three." Dennis J. Baker, The Harm Principle
vs Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and just Criminalisatzon, 33 AUSTL. J.
LEGAL PHIL. 66, 74 (2008) [hereinafter Baker, The Harm Principle vs Kantan Criteria]
(footnote omitted). For Feinberg's own explication, see FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS,
supra note 30, at 31-36, 105-06. "The word 'harm' is used ... to denote the existence of
loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (1977).
171 Kleinig writes that "harm remains 'the most underdeveloped concept in our
criminal law.'" John Kleinig, Crime and the Concept of Harm, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 27, 27
(1978) (footnote omitted). "[Elven the most cursory reflection shows that harm is
conceptually foggy, susceptible to fictional applications, and subject to ideologizing."
Id. (footnote omitted). See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
29 (1982). "[T]he question is ... not what 'harm' really means, but what reasons of
principle there are for preferring one conception to another .... [Wihich conception
answers more adequately to the purposes for which the concept is deployed."
JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 119-20 (1993) (quoted in Alan Wertheimer, Re-
marks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 889, 893 n.12 (1997)). Waldron
suggests, in our context, that we need to distinguish "harm" from "wrongful harm".
The real conceptual problem, I believe, is not harm in itself, but rather wrongful
harm. For some of the controversies, see, e.g., Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Coun-
terfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283 (2003); John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury
and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315 (2003).
172 In specifying "[t]he sense of 'harm' as that term is used in the harm principle,"
Feinberg writes, "only setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that are
setbacks to interest, are to count as harms in the appropriate sense." FEINBERG, HARM
TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 36. See Baker, The Harm Principle vs Kantian Criteria, supra
note 170, at 74.
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let us begin with Kant. He places the duty to respect another's dig-
nity as the key principle of practical reason' 7 4 Violation of this duty,
then, produces a dignitary harm. This type of harm draws a good
deal of attention in what follows.1 75 In law and morals there are also
other recognized harms: those stemming from physiology, psychol-
ogy, and economics. Along these lines, Feinberg identifies the harm
within his harm principle as a setback to a welfare and associated
interests. 76 A welfare interest, at first blush, appears to spring from
consequentialist, utilitarian, or communitarian moral reasoning, not
deontic principles.177 Practical reason, however, is quite open to,
indeed involves, consequential considerations in adopting possible
maxims, 178 so long as they do not run afoul of the categorical im-
173 "There is no distinctly legal typology of harms." MOORE, supra note 1, at 391
(1997).
174 See supra note 17; see also supra text accompanying notes 20-21. "Kant's use of
dignity (or Wtirde) is complicated." Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, in 29
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 207, 219 (Suzan Young ed., 2011). See id.
at 218-21.
175 "Respect for human dignity ... hovers over our laws like a guardian angel."
Denise G. R~aume, Indignities: Making a Place for Dignity in Modern Legal Thought, 28
QUEENS L.J. 61, 62 (2002).
176 "The trichotomy of interests delineated in [Feinberg's] harm principle includes
welfare interests and those security and accumulative interests that cushion our wel-
fare interests." Baker, The Harm Principle vs Kantian Criteria, supra note 170, at 74-75.
See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1662 (1992). Brudner neglects Feinberg's "accumulative inter-
ests" in criticizing his harm principle as inadequate to explain the criminal law,
pointing out that a protected dignitary interest (as I would call it) is necessary to do
the explanatory work. See Alan Brudner, Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law, in
ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 21, 21-24 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (later
emphasizing the centrality of "respect for agency", "freedom", or "liberty").
177 But see supra text accompanying notes 101-15 (enablements or primary goods).
178 "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in
judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy." RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 26. "Nonconsequentialism does not deny that
consequences can be a factor in determining the rightness of an act." KAMM,
INTRICATE ETHICS, supra note 22, at 11. See JACOB ADLER, THE URGINGS OF
CONSCIENCE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 13 (1991); DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 165, at 411 n.10; MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note
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perative.179 In considering the adoption of a possible maxim, an
agent contemplates the potential results of universalizing it,180 for
she will be subject to both the benefits and the burdens of the max-
im. The foreseeable effects may or may not have moral overtones, or
may have normative sources other than deontology, as where effi-
ciency or community values are given weight and weighed181 Con-
sequences aside, there is nothing inherently disrespectful about
adopting proper maxims that disallow or requite the standard types
12, at 31 n.20; PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, supra note 23, at 275; SEN, RATIONALITY,
supra note 14, at 639; Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods,
in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 90, 92 (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997). But, "[e]specially to be avoided is the idea that Kant's doctrine
provides at best only the general, or formal, elements for a utilitarian or indeed for
any other moral conception." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 221 n.29.
179 As Nozick puts it, the categorical imperative is merely a side constraint on
plausible maxims that does not exclude other considerations, normative or other-
wise. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, supra note 61, at 28-33.
180 Kant, for example, discusses the consequences of rejecting a promisekeeping
maxim. See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 17, at
74 (To universalize a law that one may intentionally break a promise when needy
"would make the promise and the end one might have in itself impossible, since no
one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions
as vain pretenses."). "[O]n the best reading of the categorical imperative test, the
maxim of an action which is tested by it includes both the act done and the end for
the sake of which that act is done." CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION 10
(2009). See SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 63.
181 "In considering.., reasons, mulling them over, one arrives at a view of which
reasons are more important, which ones have more weight." ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (1981). Marmor supports Nozick's point: "The
balancing of interests and costs . . essential for the determination of the existence of
each and every right is not necessarily a utilitarian one .... Cost-benefit analysis is
not necessarily a quantitative matter; the intrinsic values and relative importance of
the interests in question matter too." Andrei Marmor, On the Limits of Rights, 16 LAW
& PHIL. 1, 13 (1997). Marmor suggests a second step, that of weighing in addition to
weighting. Suppose a community weights the value of efficiency as greater than that
of social solidarity, say, by two-to-one. In confronting a particular tradeoff choice,
however, the community evaluator sees that the efficiency gains are minor in com-
parison to the substantial solidarity losses. In this case, though efficiency is weighti-
er, the evaluator may decide to reject that protective choice because it is overall out-
weighed by the solidarity setback.
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of legally recognized harms. Indeed, it is quite to the contrary. We
may even adopt different monetized thresholds for each type of
harm before declaring it wrongful182 From a functional viewpoint,
reflecting on the importance, even necessity, of protection against
the standard types of recognized harms provides a more direct way
to see them as under the deontic umbrella. Physical, economic, and
psychic harms are disablements. They truncate the autonomy, re-
duce the freedom, of a harmed agent by destroying, hindering, or
diverting her resources. 183 A physically injured, psychologically
distressed, or economically taxed person has fewer real, material
options to choose among.
A. TYPES OF HARMS
While potential benefits are crucial to the balancing involved in
the choice to adopt a particular maxim, it is the costs, or harms, that
receive most of the attention of commentators with a deontic orien-
tation. I will follow suit. In this section I discuss the three general
types of harms that the law prominently recognizes - physical, eco-
nomic, and psychic - though I parse them somewhat differently. 184
Then I discuss at greater length a fourth type of harm, identified
above, which the law recognizes in a more muted or interstitial
182 In monetized terms, for example, we might declare that the threshold remedia-
bility for physical harm is $0, economic harm is $100, psychic harm is $200, and dig-
nitary harm is $0.
183 "Someone who commits a tort against me robs me of the control I have over
some of the resources otherwise at my disposal .... When you negligently injure me,
you interfere with my autonomy in the sense of the control I have over resources at
my disposal." Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Mzsalignments, supra note 4,
at 554. See John Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 205, 243 (Anthony Duff ed., 1998).
"I For the ALI's division of noneconomic losses ("pain and suffering") into four
main categories, see 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199-200 (1991).
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manner - dignitary.1 85 We are, after all, constructing autonomy
from a Kantian perspective.
Physical harm, as I use the term, is harm to a person's body.18
6 It
does not include harm to property.1 87 Harm to property would fall
185 "[Hlarm, as defined in this Section, is the detriment or loss to a person
which occurs by virtue of, or as a result of, some alteration or change in his
person, or in physical things, and also the detriment resulting to him from
acts or conditions which impair his physical, emotional, or aesthetic well-
being, his pecuniary advantage, his intangible rights, his reputation, or his
other legally recognized interests."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. b (1977). Is dignitary harm to be found in
the penumbra of this definition, perhaps in his "emotional ... well-being" or "his
intangible rights, his reputation, or his other legally recognized interests"? Apparent-
ly, it is the former. "One who has a cause of action for a tort may be entitled to recov-
er as an element of damages for that form of mental distress known as humiliation,
that is, a feeling of degradation or inferiority or a feeling that other people will re-
gard him with aversion or dislike." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. d
(1977). See id. cmt. g (granting damages for intentionally caused "loss of freedom"
"for harm to feelings that result because of his inability to move freely wherever he
desires"). Hence, it appears that courts and commentators may bury the independent
notion of dignitary harm under the rubric of mental distress. See CANE,
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, supra note 29, at 214-15; Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionali-
ty, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141, 147 (Peter Cane &
Jane Stapleton eds., 1998). According to "the Mishnah (the foundation principles of
the Talmud): 'A man who injures another becomes liable to him - on five counts: for
damages, for pain, for healing, for loss of time, and for indignity."' CHARLES F. ABEL
& FRANK H. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION 109 (1984) (footnoting "Bava
Kama 5:4"). See TALMUD BAVLI (Babyloman Talmud) ch. 8, Mishna 1, at 83b. "Ulpian
famously stated, in respect of the Roman law of iniuria, that the wrong could protect
either corpus (physical integrity), fama (good name, reputation, fame, renown) or
dignitas (dignity, worth, status, standing)." Eric Descheemaeker, Defamation Outside
Reputation: Proposals for the Reform of English Law, 18 TORT L. REV. 133, 135 (2010)
(footnote omitted). Prosser and Keeton ascribe the reluctance to protect against "in-
sult and indignity" mainly to the impropriety of protecting against "every trivial
indignity" and the epistemic difficulties regarding the extent of the harm. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 59. See generally Leslie M. Henry, The Jurisprudence of
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011); Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200 (2012).
186 "Every personal injury action... rests on an unspoken assumption that each
person owns his own body." Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979) (footnote omitted). "Bodily
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within my broad notion of economic harm.1 88 Economic harm refers
to financial loss.1 8 9 While harm to property is commonly distin-
guished from harm to other economic interests (e.g., trespass versus
breach of contract), I generally run these together, partially because
I favor an expansive view of property interests. Nothing essential to
my discussion turns on this distinction. Reshuffling these types of
economic and other harms would leave my central analysis in
place. Moreover, maxims may explicitly subdivide the various
harms, as where requital maxims grant relief for some types of eco-
nomic harm (e.g., medical expenses), but not others (e.g., opportuni-
ty costs of litigation).
Psychic harm includes "virtually any form of conscious suffer-
ing, both emotional and physical." 190 Psychic harms, then, have two
harm is any impairment of the physical condition of the body, including illness or
physical pain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. b (1977). Because purely
physical pain is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish from emotional pain, I push
physical pain into the category of psychic harm.
187 Physical harm has been defined more broadly. "The words 'physical harm' are
used . . . to denote the physical impairment of the human body, or of land or chat-
tels." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(3) (1977).
188 Interestingly, harm to property, such as a theft, may be detrimental to the in-
vader and beneficial to the invadee. For example, an invader may steal a "white
elephant", say, a pet that unexpectedly gives her no pleasure, while the invadee
experiences physical, economic, and psychic gains ("At last I'm free of that nipping
pest."). A burdensome heirloom may provide another example.
119 The Insurance Information Institute supplied this definition of "economic loss":
"Total financial loss resulting from the death or disability of a wage earner, or from
the destruction of property. Includes the loss of earnings, medical expenses, funeral
expenses, the cost of restoring or replacing property, and legal expenses. It does not
include noneconomic losses, such as pain caused by an injury." Economic Loss, INS.
INFO. INST., available at http://www.compuquotes.com/insurance-definition-
economic-loss.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). A new Restatement takes another
slant, excluding harm to property. "For purposes of this Restatement, 'economic loss'
is pecuniary damage not arising from injury to the plaintiff's person or from physical
harm to the plaintiff's property." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
ECONOMIC HARM § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012).
190 DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 1050 (footnotes omitted) (identifying
"[tihe pain for which [tort] recovery is allowed. ). For elaboration, see id. at 1051-
53. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, in detailing compensatory damages for non-
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sources: first, pain and suffering that stem from physical harm;191
and second, mental or emotional harm, whatever its origin.192 These
two centers of psychic harms significantly interrelate. 193 Psychic
harms beyond physical pain and suffering include insecurity, fear,
pecuniary harm, specifically identifies humiliation, fear and anxiety, and feelings
from loss of freedom. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmts. d, e, g (1977).
Existing law is not generous in protecting against psychic harm. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 54-60, 359-60 ("mental distress" and "mental disturbance"); John C.P.
Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828, 1845 (1999).
191 Ripstein gives short shrift to pain and suffering as a harm to an enablement of
the invadee: Unlike compensatory damages, "damages [for pain and suffering] do
not restore or correct anything .... Your happiness, considered as such, is not among
the means you use to set and pursue your purposes, even if, for example, your men-
tal health could be described as something you use in that way." Arthur Ripstein, As
If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1984 (2007).
192 For example, "hedonic damages", going beyond "traditional pain and suffering
or mental anguish damages .... compensate for limitations 'on the injured person's
ability to participate in and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, or
for the individual's inability to pursue his talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or
avocation."' Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 748 (2007) (quoting Boan v. Black-
well, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2001)). "Disability damages" are distinguishable since
they "are not based on the effect of disability on life's enjoyment ...." Id. at 751.
"Research on attitudes toward promise and contract indicates that there is a special
psychological harm in breaching a contract, a harm that is conceptually separate
from the financial or actual losses of the promisee." Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fault in
Contracts: A Psychological Approach, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 289, 290
(Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010). A breach of contract may feel like a be-
trayal. "People seem to respond more negatively, and more punitively, to harms
caused by a trusted agent than identical harms not caused by a trusted agent." Id. at
291 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 531 (2005) ("be-
trayal heuristic")). "The[] psychological effects [of burglary in a dwelling] are well
documented: [two researchers] found that about a quarter of victims 'are, temporari-
ly at least, badly shaken by the experience', and that a small minority of victims suf-
fer longer-lasting effects." ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 386
(6th ed. 2009) (footnote omitted).
-3 Though perhaps obscure, "[t]he basic distinction [from pain and suffering] is
that hedonic damages cover not affirmative distress or suffering but foregone gains,
as when people are unable to engage in valued activities, such as athletics." Cass R.
Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S159 (2007) (footnote omitted). For
hedonic damages, "it is extremely difficult to translate the relevant interest into
monetary equivalents." Id. at S160.
CONSTRUCTING AUTONOMY
fright, terror, panic, shock, sadness, dread, anger, outrage, offense,
and many other undesirable mental states.194 These may arise from,
among other things, risks directed at specific individuals with their
knowledge, such as assault, the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and criminal attempts. Another important origin of psychic
harms is from general, undirected, or immediately unperceived
risks created by others, as by reckless practices, inchoate crimes,
and recidivism. Psychic harms have many causes. To be relevant
here, they must survive the deontic filter. Again, harms from disre-
spectful emotional reactions do not count.
Dignitary harm arises from a setback to a person's interest and
right to be respected as an autonomous, ethical being, of priceless
moral worth equal to that of other ethical beings.195 There is no con-
sensus about the meanings of dignity and respect.196 As analyzed
194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1977).
19S ee KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 20, at 557, 579.
196 "There does not seem to be any canonical definition of 'dignity' in the law."
Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 174, at 211. For Waldron's identifica-
tion of the immanent aspects of legal rights reflecting dignity, see id. at 236-50. See
NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES, supra note 53, at 29 [dignity]; Robin S. Dillon,
Respect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa1l2010/entries/respect/ (last visited Aug. 7,
2013) [respect and self-respect]; Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 66, 67 (2011) [dignity]; Wright, Consenting Adults, supra note 99, at 1398
[dignity]. One commentator "identifies three concepts of dignity used by constitu-
tional courts and demonstrates how these concepts are fundamentally different ...."
Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 183 (2011) For a summary, see id. at 187-89 ("inherent worth", "living in a cer-
tain way", "recognition and respect"). Rosen similarly identifies these three mean-
ings of dignity. See ROSEN, supra note 22, at 54 ("status", "inherent value", "behavior,
character, or bearing"). "The concept of dignity has become debased by flabby over-
use in political rhetoric .... But we need the idea, and the cognate idea of self-respect,
if we are to make much sense of our situation and our ambitions." DWORKIN, JUSTICE
FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 90, at 13. For Waldron's "controversial" account of digni-
ty as a "status-concept", see Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, supra note 185, at
201; Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 174. For reference to scholars and
jurists who find the concept of dignity to be too vague to be useful, see ROSEN, supra,
at 1-8; Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, supra note 185, at 174-75. Henry, identify-
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here, a dignitary harm stems from the objective manifestation of
another person's disregard, dismissal, insult, disparagement, defa-
mation, contempt, 197 ridicule, spite, malice, 198 or other forms of dis-
respect.199 In other words, explicit or implicit denial of a person's
equal moral worth produces a dignitary harm.20 0 Disrespect implies
a claim of moral superiority contrary to Kant's egalitarianism
ing five overlapping conceptions of dignity, finds to the contrary of the doubters. See
Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, supra note 185, at 177. Rao suggests that "digni-
ty", "a relatively new legal term", will become less nebulous as the law works out its
meaning, as it has with "liberty" and "equality".Rao, supra, at 190. For analyses of
dignity, see Denise G. R~aume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645, 672-94
(2003) ("Defining Dignity"); Doron Shultziner & Itai Rabinovici, Human Digmty, Self-
Worth and Humiliation: A Comparative Legal-Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB
POL'Y, & L. 105 (2012).
"Dignity in the Kantian sense is something that persons possess as such and
therefore regardless of how they are treated by others: treating a person with pity or
contempt or ridicule does not remove her dignity in this Kantian sense .... " Ian
Carter, Respect and the Basis of Equality, 121 ETHICS 538, 554 (2011). "[Tlhe role that
dignity plays in Kant's ethical thinking is not straight-forward (or, unfortunately,
easy to explain)." ROSEN, supra, at 19. For explanation, see id. at 19-31. See generally
Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHIL. 251 (1976).
197 For the unbearableness of contempt, see Jon Elster, Justice, Truth, Peace, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 78, 83 (Melissa S. Williams et al. eds., 2012) (quoting Voltaire,
Adam Smith, and John Adams).
198 "[Mlalice might be better characterized as the intentional violation of dignity."
R6aume, Indignities, supra note 175, at 79.
199 As regarding mental states relevant to responsibility, "practical judgments ...
rest on an interpretation of what the agent said and did - viewed against a back-
ground of 'relevant' circumstances - as manifesting or not manifesting the mental
state in question." CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, supra note 29, at 47 (footnote to
commentators with a similar approach omitted). See id. at 47-48.
200 "Most criminal acts [requiring mens real inflict dignitary harms .... Dignitary
harms are the indignities that an actor A inflicts upon S by manifesting that he has so
little regard for S that he is ready to abridge S's legitimate interests in order to ag-
grandize himself." PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 149 (2004) (the omitted
footnote excluding public crimes, such as tax evasion and bribery). Hampton analyz-
es what I call "dignitary harm" somewhat differently. "[S]ome [wrongful] moral
actions violate [applicable moral] standards in a particular way insofar as they are
also an affront to the victim's value or dignity. I call such an affront a moral injury."
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs, supra note 176, at 1666. See
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs, supra note 176, at 1679. "A moral
injury is not the same as a wrongful loss or harm." Id. at 1666.
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among moral agents.2 1 The understood meaning of a person's con-
duct in this regard, that is, the degree of disrespectfulness, is cultur-
ally situated.202 A pat on the back may be acceptable in some cir-
cumstances or societies, but not others. Even if the disrespectful
person does not treat the other person with disrespect, in that dises-
teem is not manifested by any impinging action, her disrespectful
attitude still constitutes a violation of the categorical imperative.20 3
When such disrespect is manifested, it engenders a dignitary
harm. 204
201 As Ackerman puts his principle of neutrality (without invoking Kant): "No
reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert ... that ... he is in-
trinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980). Dworkin emphasizes the justice prin-
ciple of equal concern and respect. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
180-83, 272-78 (1977).
202 "[A] person is morally injured when she is the target of behavior whose mean-
ing, appropriately understood by members of the cultural community in which the
behavior occurs, represents her value as less than the value she should be accorded."
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs, supra note 176 at 1670. "What
counts as humiliating or degrading treatment varies drastically from culture to cul-
ture . . . ." ROSEN, supra note 22, at 127. See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical
Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 45
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Filimon Peonidis, Freedom of Expression,
Autonomy, and Defamation, 17 LAW & PHIL. 1, 5 (1998).
203 "The attitudes of respect, then, have cognitive dimensions (beliefs, acknowl-
edgments, judgments, deliberations, commitments), affective dimensions (emotions,
feelings, ways of experiencing things), and conative dimensions (motivations, dispo-
sitions to act and forbear from acting); some forms also have valuational dimen-
sions." Robin S. Dillon, Respect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall201O/entries/respect/ (last visited Aug. 7,
2013). "The attitude is typically regarded as central to respect ... ." Id. "Negative"
respect entails "doing nothing to impair or destroy [persons'] capacity for autono-
my," as by interference with their autonomous decisions and morally acceptable
pursuits, coercion, deception, or paternalism. Id. "Positive" respect involves "protect-
ing them from threats to their autonomy (which may require intervention when
someone's current decisions seem to put their own autonomy at risk) and by promot-
ing autonomy and the conditions for it," as by teaching individuals to be independ-
ent and responsible. Id.
204 "Kant ... stress[es] the moral importance of attitude and gesture aside from
their consequences. Mockery is opposed, whether or not it is effective for the pur-
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Under my conception of dignitary harm, all deontic wrongs
cause harm. At the very least, such a wrong creates a dignitary
harm, even if there is no accompanying physical, economic, or psy-
chic harm.205 A prominent form of dignitary harm is the denial of an
invadee's established claims from deontic maxims.20 6 The failure to
invite someone to join a secular club because of her race or religion
occasions a dignitary harm even if she suffers no other type of
harm. Though existing law seems to keep dignitary harms largely
in the backrooms, if not closets, several torts and crimes
acknowledge them.20 7 Among those that do to some extent are as-
pose of reform or deterrent, because it reflects a disrespectful attitude toward the
humanity of others." HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 20, at 55.
Hill's Kantian account treats snobbery as a wrongful attitude in itself. See HILL, JR.,
Social Snobbery, supra note 20, at 156-57. "Respect... signifies an emotional attitude
we owe persons as well as just and courteous conduct displaying that attitude."
SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 198.
205 "The harm in question [in some intentional torts] need not be experiential; it
may be dignitary." Sheinman, Tort Law, supra note 2, at 32 (footnote omitted). See
Daniel McDermott, The Permissibility of Punishment, 20 LAW & PHIL. 403, 411-30
(2001). Ripstein apparently does not see all dignitary invasions as harms. "It is also
possible to wrong someone.., without doing that person any harm. If I [nonconsen-
sually invade your body or property without any damage], I draw you into my pur-
poses and wrong you, even if, as it turns out, you never learn of my action ......
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 22. See ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 192, at 29 (discussing the absence of harm from the rape of
an unconscious, unknowing, unaffected victim). To the contrary of Ripstein and
Ashworth, I would say that you have suffered a dignitary harm from me. For my
own purposes, I have used you as a means only. Ripstein notes, "Kant understands
wrongdoing as the interference with freedom, not with the setting back of interests."
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 68. But as Ripstein also notes, free-
dom requires a tradeoff, a balancing, of one's interests in liberty and security. See
supra note 32. I have invaded your security interest, set back your interest if you will,
in being free of disrespect.
206 Even consent, of some degree, may not preclude dignitary harm. "[Clonsensual
sex, when it is unwanted and unwelcome, often carries harms to the personhood,
autonomy, integrity, and identity of the person who consents to it ...." Robin West,
Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHIcs OF CONSENT 221, 224 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan
Wertheimer eds., 2010).
207 Speaking generally of "dignitary harm without physical harm", Dobbs reports,
"When the trespassory tort causes no physical harm, the traditional tort rule is that
CONSTRUCTING AUTONOMY
sault, 208 offensive battery, 2 9 false imprisonment, 210 defamation,211
and, apparently, the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 212
the plaintiff can nevertheless recover substantial as distinct from nominal damages.
The idea is loosely linked to the idea of mental distress, but no actual proof of mental
distress is required." DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 79. The invasion "is
regarded as a harm in itself". Id. Courts and commentators often fail to distinguish
psychic and dignitary harms. Typically there is no urgency for them to do so since
the two harms are usually intertwined.
208 Blackstone, in describing assault, refers to "assault, insultus". 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (1768). The torts restatement distinguishes "ap-
prehension" from "tangible and material harm", indicating that dignitary, not only
psychic, harm is protected by assault liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
21 cmt. c (1977) ("It is not necessary that [the proscribed act] should directly or indi-
rectly cause any tangible and material harm to the other."). In discussing "dignitary
harm without physical harm," Dobbs writes that mental distress is not required to
recover substantial damages. "The invasion ... is regarded as a harm in itself and
subject to an award of damages. [If mental distress is also present,] even without
physical harm, [the plaintiff] is entitled to recover for that emotional distress as a
separate element of damages." DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 79. But Prosser
and Keeton suggest a somewhat different view. "This action [of assault], which de-
veloped very early as a form of trespass, is the first recognition of a mental, as dis-
tinct from a physical, injury." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 43 (footnote omitted).
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. d (1977) ("The actor's liability is
based upon his intentional invasion of the other's dignitary interest in the inviolabil-
ity of his person and the affront to the other's dignity involved therein."); DOBBS,
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 55 (For battery, "an offensive touching is one that
infringes a reasonable sense of personal dignity."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 16
(1999) ("The law of offensive battery is directed to words or actions by defendant
designed to insult or offend plaintiff without putting her at risk of bodily harm.").
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 cmt. h (1977) ("The mere dignitary
interest in feeling free to choose one's own location and, therefore, in freedom from
the realization that one's will to choose one's location is subordinated to the will of
another is ... [not a] perfectly protected interest, such as that in bodily security ....");
DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 80. In Whittaker v. Sandford, 85 A. 399, 402-
03 (Me. 1912), a falsely imprisoned woman, not closely confined, was given reduced
damages because "[t]he case lacks the elements of humiliation and disgrace that
frequently attend false imprisonment. She was respectfully treated as a guest in eve-
ry way, except that she was restrained from quitting the yacht for good and all."
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977)- ("A communication is de-
famatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the esti-
mation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."). Speaking of defamation, Prosser and Keeton observe, "Since some of the
interests served by way of protecting a good reputation are of a peace-of-mind and
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Trespass to real property may cause only a dignitary harm allowing
for nominal damages, such as when stepping on another's concrete
driveway results in no other type of harm. 213 A breach of contract
that causes no economic harm may also be seen as causing a digni-
tary harm only.214 Sometimes dignitary harms are noticed by the
law, but not protected by remedies, as in certain slights.215 The crim-
dignitary nature rather than economic in character, such losses are not readily meas-
urable in monetary terms." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 843.
212 For epistemic and other reasons, courts are wary of granting relief for emotion-
al distress alone, but if the behavior is outrageous enough, relief will be granted. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977). When wariness is overcome, beneath
the recovery for emotional distress is seen, arguably, a protected dignitary interest.
In discussing this tort, Dobbs offers a glimpse. "On the personal rather than the eco-
nomic level, insult, affront, indignity, trivial annoyance, or the like, are likewise ex-
cluded from the outrage category (although perhaps still sufficient in some common
carrier cases)." DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 826 (footnote omitted). R-
aume "argues that dignity, as a legally protected interest, is the appropriate basis for
development of this area of the law [dealing with the concept of emotional tranquili-
ty], and that the next logical step is to replace the [Canadian] tort of intentional inflic-
tion of nervous shock with a dignity-based tort." R~aume, Indignities, supra note 175,
at 61.
213 See GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6 ("A plaintiff whose dignity was of-
fended might also recover for trespass to land, even if the defendant had not harmed
his property, provided the defendant had entered it."); Lucy, supra note 33, at 207
(including trespass to person also). "[In the context of trespass and battery,] the idea
that your means are subject to your choice carries with it the entitlement to exclude
all others from subjecting those means to their purposes, even in the trivial sense of
touching you without your permission." Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, supra
note 191, at 1970. See Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and
Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 169-70 (2011).
214 "It might be thought that an action for breach of contract cannot succeed with-
out pecuniary loss. The English courts have been grappling with this issue for some
time." LUCY, supra note 33, at 207 n.3 (including case citations).
215 "There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants [be-
yond common carriers, innkeepers, etc.] are not liable for mere insult, indignity,
annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other circumstances of ag-
gravation." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 59. "Our manners, and with them our law,
have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy in the
form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance." Id. These quotes show the
interrelationship between psychic and dignitary harm. The thrust of the observation
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inal defense of provocation may be partially based on the idea that
the provoker had inflicted a dignitary harm on the provoked actor
by effectively disrespecting or demeaning her.216
The extent of a dignitary harm is gauged, I would argue, from
the perspective of the disrespected person. Her understanding of
the other person's pertinent opinion of her, and her reactive re-
sponse to it, arise from the invader's objective manifestation of a
disrespectful mental state.217 The invader may even be unaware of
the disrespectfulness she manifests.218 This would not affect the in-
vadee's reaction to the conduct unless, it seems, the invadee is
aware of the invader's ignorance. There is a role, however, for the
invader's subjective disrespectfulness, irrespective of how it is man-
ifested, but not right here. The invader's subjective mental state is a
factor in gauging her relative disrespect blameworthiness, to be ad-
dressed shortly.219
is that, though there may be a dignitary harm in these circumstances, such harm is
not wrongful under existing law.
216 "The paradigm case of provocation in murder involves a degree of fault on the
victim's part, such as where the victim assaults, torments, or goads the offender and
thereby precipitates their killing." Martin Wasik, Crime Seriousness and the Offender-
Victim Relationship in Sentencing, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 103, 118
(Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998) (footnote omitted). See A.J. Ash-
worth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307 (1976). But cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 69 cmt. a (1977) ("Mere provocation by words or
conduct, no matter how insulting, does not destroy the privilege of self-defense, even
though a reasonable man should realize that the provocation will probably induce
the attack.").
217 "[Tlhe participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to
the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes
and actions." P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL AND REACTIVE
ATTITUDES 19, 25 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 2008).
218 "It is not material to the notion of guilt, that the offender have himself been ful-
ly conscious of the wickedness of what he did." DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES (1819) (quoted in VICTOR TADROS,
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 221 (2005)).
219 See discussion infra at Part VI.B.
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Dignitary harms can occur without any male fides by the in-
vader, as where she innocently trespasses. Under the common law,
physical, economic, and psychic harms are gauged by the impact of
an invasion on the invadee, irrespective of the extent of such harms
intended by the invader, and often loosely tied, if at all, to the
harms foreseeable by the actor. 220 Similarly, dignitary harm is
measured from the invadee's perspective. Dignitary harms depend
on the invadee's perception of the actor's mental state, such as
when words that could be seen as insulting are instead perceived as
meant to be humorous. This understanding may also, naturally,
affect the invadee's psychic and other harms. As a practical matter,
to say nothing of fairness, one would probably base the appraisal of
dignitary harm on the standard of a reasonable person in the posi-
tion of the invadee who is aware of the actor's manifested disre-
spect.221
The objective manifestation of disrespect may obtain whether or
not the disrespected person is actually aware of it.222 Insult, which
220 1 question the fairness of this, supra at Part III.C.
221 If the actual person feels disrespect when a reasonable person in her position
would not, we could say that the actual person suffers a dignitary harm, but not a
wrongful dignitary harm.
m See Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs, supra note 176, at 1671.
Lack of awareness of the dignitary harm may come from ignorance or because of an
invadee "whose sense of self-worth is so low that she is unable to recognize the...
wrong." Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs, supra note 176, at 1671.
Feinberg, among others, asserts that one can be harmed posthumously. See FEINBERG,
HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 30, at 79-95. For interesting discussion of Feinberg's
analysis with criticism and tangential support, see BRIAN ANGELO LEE, MORAL
OBLIGATIONS TO PAST GENERATIONS (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Prince-
ton University) (on file with author). Contrary to Feinberg's intuition, Adler finds, "It
is a widely shared intuition that posthumous events do not harm the deceased per-
son .... " Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2003) (questioning whether death is a harm
to the decedent, concluding it is a welfare setback). Whether, in general, there are
"duties to the dead" is controversial. That the dead cannot have Hohfeldian rights,
see Ronen Perry, Correlativty, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537, 547 (2009). Under one deontic
view, "even if we are murdered, that action cannot lower us in value (as if we re-
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requires knowledge by the disrespected person sooner or later, is
distinguishable from defamation, which does not. 2 But defamation
does require knowledge of the disrespectfulness by third parties.224
Defamation harms depend on the understanding of third persons of
the invader's mental state, such as whether her conduct is meant to
sting or to humor.225 Similarly, the sufferer's perception of the un-
derstanding by third persons of the potentially defamatory conduct
may produce or exacerbate a dignitary harm, to say nothing of her
reactive psychic and other harms. In general, dignitary harms, like
other harms, are socially framed.226 Conduct seen as insulting in one
community or one context may not be in others. 227 A person may
perceive a dignitary harm, but social norms declare it not wrongful,
as in a case in which a person is insulted or feels defamed by an
ordinary hug from a casual acquaintance.
The time at which a dignitary harm is gauged may affect its
measure. The invadee's reasonable perception of her dignitary
mained behind in the corpse), but only extinguish that which was valuable." Hamp-
ton, supra, at 1673.
223 While it may not be harmful to the dead person herself, "defamation of the
dead ... can be harmful to those who are alive, perhaps because it is disturbing to
hear a loved one defamed, or because it creates insecurity to the living to know they
might be defamed after death." Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Of-
fense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335, 376 (2000).
224 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 577 (1977). One commentator
"would like to extend this legal definition [of defamation] to include statements that
tend to insult, hurt, provoke, humiliate and ridicule individuals, even if they are not
communicated to a third party." Peonidis, Freedom of Expression, Autonomy, and Def-
amation, supra note 202, at 5.
25 One "meaning of an action is determined by the reactions of others (or by the
ways it would be reasonable for them to react) .... Meaning in this broader sense is.
.. a matter of what others reasonably or unreasonably take [the agent's] reasons to
be." SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 22, at 53.
226 "Dignity is socially constructed, which means that it is a product of social prac-
tices and conventions ...." Raume, Indignities, supra note 175, at 87.
227 Scanlon observes that it would be "demeaning" to have one's parents pick
one's spouse "in societies in which arranged marriages are not the norm," but not in
ones in which arranged marriages are common. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra
note 117, at 253.
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harm may vary during the course of an extended interaction with
her invader. An invasion may occur at one point and the ultimate
requital and resolution of the invasion may occur at later trial or
even many years after that. For example, at the time of a dignitary
invasion the invadee may perceive it as malicious, after evidence is
produced at trial she may perceive it as reckless, and years later as
she comes to understand the actor's position differently, she may
perceive it as negligent or minimally blameworthy. Or, the percep-
tion of the dignitary harm may go from minimal to egregious, or
back and forth, over time. Interactions with family and supporters,
media coverage, demonstrations, fund-raising efforts, and parole
hearings are among the multitude of contingencies that may influ-
ence perceptions. Similarly, insofar as the invadee's perception of
her dignitary harm is affected by her understanding of the actor's
responsibility for his invasive conduct, varying perceptions of his
responsibility alter the perceived dignitary harm. "He tried to get
me" causes greater dignitary (and psychic) harm than "He should
have known better," or "He couldn't help himself." The question,
then, is whether or how these varying perceptions should bear up-
on the gauge of a dignitary harm.228 Does the gauge account for the
fact that the invadee's reasonable perceptions of it may linger long
after the invasion and vary in intensity? Or is the gauge fixed at one
point in time, say, at the time of the invasion or shortly thereafter?
Just as recoveries under the common law for the other three types
of harms account for future effects, such as continuing disabilities
and medical expenses, should this be the case for dignitary harm?
m The positive and negative reactions of onlookers to the conduct of the invadee
may also vary with the ebb and flow of the interactions between the invadee and the
invader, as where she is first seen as a wimp and later as gutsy. See Bailey Kuklin,
Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989).
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To emphasize the point, dignitary harms are independent of
other types of harms. 229 For instance, when beneficent paternalism
motivates a person to deny a friend the freedom to make a particu-
lar choice, such as by hiding a dieter's sweets without her consent,
the paternalized person suffers a dignitary harm even if there is no
physical, economic, or psychic harm.230 To the contrary, she may
admittedly be benefitted. 231 For another example, suppose a person
declines to apply for a club membership because its members are
disrespectful of her race or religion. She suffers a dignitary harm
whether or not she would suffer other types of harms, including
psychic ones ("Who would want to associate with such bigots?").
Other examples of the possibility of dignitary harms in the absence
of psychic harms include cases where the invadee is permanently
229 "Harm to dignity is more a matter of the social meaning of particular behav-
iour than a matter of the specific emotional or physical impact on the victim." R&
aume, Indignities, supra note 175, at 86-87 (footnote omitted). "Wrongs against reputa-
tion involve using a person's reputation in a way that he or she has not authorized..
. . [N]o showing of either fault or harm is required, and ..., in the absence of harm,
general damages are assessed." Ripstein, Civil Recourse, supra note 213, at 169 n.21.
Contrary to Ripstein, I would say there is a harm - a dignitary harm. See GOLDBERG
& ZIPURSKY, TORTS, supra note 62, at 313.
230 "Of all the tyrannies[,] a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive . . Their very kindness stings with intolerable insult."
JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 103 (1973) (quoting C.S. Lewis, The Humani-
tanan Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 225 (1952-54)). "[Rlespect for a person's
autonomy is respect for his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determi-
nant of his actions except where the interests of others need protection from him."
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 26, at 68 (emphasis omitted). See RIPSTEIN, FORCE
AND FREEDOM, supra note 10, at 43-44; Tom L. Beauchamp, Who Deserves Autonomy,
and Whose Autonomy Deserves Respect, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY 310, 311-12 (James S.
Taylor ed., 2005). At some point, however, "[o]n the view that only rational, fully
informed selves are autonomous, it follows that the most fierce and uncompromising
interferences with a person's value judgments, desire formation, or thought patterns
are not interferences with autonomy at all if those values, desires, or thoughts are
irrational ones." John Christman, Introduction, in THE INNER CITADEL 3, 12 (John
Christman ed., 1989).
231 See BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM, supra note 101, at 31.
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comatose,232 is a consummate stoic, or where she appreciates ex post
the actor's beneficent, loving paternalism.
233
A dignitary harm may interrelate with or trigger physical, eco-
nomic, and psychic harms. Nausea or a heart attack, for example,
may follow from disrespectful conduct. As the perceived painful-
ness and rate of recovery from physical trauma may turn on wheth-
er the comparable trauma is from child birth, a battle injury, or a car
accident, so it may turn on the sufferer's perception of the invader's
mental state.234 Economic harm may link to dignitary harm, such as
opportunity costs and expenditures from attempts to avoid future
insult, all the more so as the insult is perceived as malevolent. Psy-
chic harm typically flows from dignitary harm.235 Can we not recall
our own experiences of insult as further examples? 236 Finally, the
232 cf. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 1052 (discussing recovery of a coma-
tose person for loss of enjoyment of life).
"[L]ove arguably does need respect, lest love be paternalistic or otherwise in-
vasive .... Marcia W. Baron, Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue, in KANT'S
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 391, 400 (Mark Timmons ed., 2002) (qualifying footnote
omitted). See WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS, supra note 24, at 179 ("we must be careful to
love others in a way that maintains respect for them").
234 "Different prior experience, emotions and expectations are only several factors
proven to be important in modulation of pain." Koraljka M. Stanke & Dragutin
Ivanec, Social Context of Pain Perception: The Role of Other People's Presence and Physical
Distance, 17 REV. PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (2010) (references omitted). "Pain experience ... is
shaped by expectations and beliefs, attentional focus, and social context." Marieke
Jepma & Tor D. Wager, Multiple Potential Mechanisms for Context Effects on Pain, PAIN
(2013), http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/files/papers/Jepma-WagerPain.pdf.
23- "If it is proper to feel indignation when I see third parties morally wronged,
must it not be equally proper to feel resentment when I experience the moral wrong
done to myself?" Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY
& JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 18 (1988). "Interestingly enough, a
hasty readiness to forgive - or even a refusal to display resentment initially - may
reveal a lack of respect, not just for oneself, but for others as well." Id.
236 In the leading case establishing a tort for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the plaintiff, in response to a "practical joke", suffered "a violent shock to
her nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent
physical consequences at one time threatening her reason, and entailing weeks of
suffering and incapacity to her as well as expense to her husband for medical attend-
ance." Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 58.
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invadee's autonomy, liberty, may be effectively constricted owing
to her reluctance to interact with third persons who were swayed
by a wrongful, defamatory message.237
How does one gauge or value dignitary harm? At best, with
great difficulty. At worst, it is not possible. As Kant proclaims, dig-
nity "is exalted above any price ...."238 If this is the case, perhaps we
must be satisfied simply by symbolically acknowledging that the
invadee has suffered a wrongful dignitary harm. Nominal damages
of 6¢ or $1 dollar would do this. Yet this seems intuitively unsatis-
factory. After an egregious act of disrespect, the aggressor gets off
with such a minimal, symbolic requital, indeed, no more than is due
for a marginal dignitary harm! Or, more to the point, from the in-
vadee's perspective the law may appear indifferent to the extent to
which the invader manifests wrongful disrespect of her. That is in-
sulting! Perhaps this complication can be partially addressed by
turning to psychic harm as a surrogate. If dignitary harm is gauged
by a reasonable person's psychic reaction to an antagonist's known
disrespectful conduct towards the invadee, then we have a plausi-
ble means to monetize the dignitary harm. Should the actual suffer-
er's psychic harm be even greater, additional recovery may be
proper. While this standard is still difficult to apply, at least we
have affirmed that not all disrespectful conduct is the same. As they
do for other knotty questions, let a jury of peers, after judicial guid-
ance, take on the task of putting numbers to the dignitary harm. 239
237 See Peonidis, Freedom of Expression, Autonomy, and Defamation, supra note 202, at
10-13.
238 KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 20, at 557. See id. at 579; KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 17, at 84.
239 See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (1999). "The civil jury's virtues are
said to include ... keeping the law in touch with popular values . Id. at 435-36
(footnote omitted).
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VI. BLAMEWORTHINESS (CULPABILITY)
Blameworthiness, which may be an element in a substantive,
first-order maxim, or an associated requital, second-order maxim,
has two foci. First, there is responsibility blameworthiness, Br,
which relates to the extent of the agent's responsibility for making
her choice to act or refrain from acting.240 Second, there is disrespect
blameworthiness, Bd, which examines the degree of the agent's dis-
respectfulness regarding those who are put at wrongful risk of
harm by her chosen conduct. These two foci provide the gauge of
the actor's overall blameworthiness as measured against a baseline
standard established by the particular maxim in question.241 She
may be more or less blameworthy than the standard established by
the maxim.242
A. RESPONSIBILITY BLAMEWORTHINESS
The first aspect of blameworthiness, responsibility blamewor-
thiness, Br, springs from Aristotle. He identifies fully responsible
conduct as following choices free from avoidable ignorance and
240 "One of the strongest and most persistent themes in the philosophical literature
dealing with responsibility is that responsibility requires culpability (or 'blamewor-
thiness')." CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, supra note 29, at 65. See R. JAY WALLACE,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 128 (1994).
241 "Unfortunately, no adequate theory to measure degrees of culpability has yet
been proposed." Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance,
Knowledge, and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the
Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 54 (citing Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpabil-
ity: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193 (1993)). Compare Fletcher's
"General Framework of Retributive Punishment", in George P. Fletcher, The Recidi-
vist Premium, 1(2) CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 56-57 (1982).
242 Finkelstein doubts the weight of blameworthiness in the existing law. Because
some morally blameworthy conduct is neither tortious nor criminal, and some liabil-
ity is strict, she concludes, "In both tort and criminal law, then, blameworthiness is of
questionable importance for determining liability." Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a
Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 964 (2003).
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coercion. 243 Thus, responsibility blameworthiness has two prongs:
ignorance, Br1; and coercion, 13, Insofar as an agent's choice is not
fully autonomous in this sense, her responsibility, her blamewor-
thiness, is reduced until, at some threshold point, she is excused
altogether. 244 On the other hand, against the threshold standard for
responsible choice, the agent may be in a position to make a choice
with a greater freedom from ignorance and coercion. She has, say,
an unusually deep knowledge and understanding of possible con-
sequences of her contemplated conduct. Potential ensuing harmful
consequences to others are foreseeable to her that would not be
foreseeable to ordinary actors. This agent is also uncommonly free
of coercive influences on her choice. She expects, for instance, to
obtain no significant benefits from her anticipated conduct beyond
those achievable by a known option that would not put others at
wrongful risk. For this invader, a choice to engage in the wrongfully
risky conduct makes her more than ordinarily blameworthy for
harmful consequences.
Under the existing law of negligence, the degree of an agent's
responsibility for her chosen conduct necessary to trigger liability is
based on a reasonable person standard. If a reasonable person in
243 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, ch. 1, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 935, 964-67 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). For a brief description of current
theories of responsibility ("moral accountability"), see Ripstein, Justice and Responsi-
bility, supra note 71, at 361-62.
244 That autonomy is a matter of degree, see, e.g., HERMAN, MORAL LITERACY, supra
note 117, at 127; Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, supra note 27, 70-71;
Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, supra note 40, at 159.
In the criminal context, excuses are often said to be denials of blameworthiness.
See, e.g., FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra note 81, at 85. Alexander and Ferzan argue
that both justifications and excuses are denials of blameworthiness. See LARRY
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 88-91 (2009). The Model
Penal Code may agree. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE
249 (2002). In the civil law context, H.L.A. Hart identifies "invalidating" conditions
rather than the parallel "excusing" conditions in the criminal law. See H.L.A. HART,
Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 34 (1968). 1
ignore these permutations in my general category of responsibility blameworthiness.
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her position would feel strongly compelled to choose her conduct,
or would choose the conduct despite her information shortfalls,
then, generally, she is not responsible for the harmful consequences
that follow. 245 As freedom from coercion and ignorance increases, a
point is reached at which the reasonable person would forgo the
conduct in question to avoid putting others at unreasonable risk. At
this point, requital for ensuing harms is allowable. The conduct is
not excused. Beyond this point, as the agent becomes increasingly
free of coercion and ignorance as to possible consequences, she be-
comes more responsible, more blameworthy, for choosing the un-
reasonable conduct nonetheless. The threshold for responsibility
may vary from tort to tort, or crime to crime.246 Trespass to realty,
for example, requires minimal knowledge by the invader,247 while
malicious prosecution requires much more.248 Even though liability
for breach of contract under existing law is often said to be strict,2
49
blameworthiness does play a role here also.250 Current private law
245 Many qualifications to this sweeping generalization are omitted. Ripstein pro-
vides guidance. "1 defend what I will call a reciprocity conception of responsibility,
which supposes that responsibility must be understood in terms of norms governing
what people are entitled to expect of each other." Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility,
supra note 71, at 361. See FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS, supra note 81, at 108. The rea-
sonable person standard establishes what people are entitled to expect.
246 "It is misleading to speak of 'legal responsibility' - as though it were a unitary
thing. It is not.... Even if we confine ourselves to criminal law, there is no single con-
ception." KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT, supra note 230, at 106.
247 As in other ordinary intentional torts, the "intent" requirement for trespass is
rather weak, falling well short of "motive". See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8 (5th
ed. 1984); DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at § 24.
248 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 882-84; DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63,
at § 433.
249 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.8 (4th ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981).
250 "It is often asserted that contract law is based on strict liability, not fault. This
assertion is incorrect. As this chapter demonstrates, fault is a basic building block of
contract law, and pervades the field." Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Con-
tract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Non-
performance, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 82, 82 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel
Porat eds., 2010). See Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or
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rarely takes heightened responsibility beyond the given threshold
into account.251 The criminal law is more attentive to it.252
B. DISRESPECT BLAMEWORTHINESS
Disrespect blameworthiness, Bd, relates to an agent's attitude as
well as her conduct towards persons wrongfully harmed. She is to
How to Do Economics Right, Without Really Trying, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT
LAW 118, 118 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010 ("different standards of fault
are appropriate in different [contract] contexts"); Tony Weir, The Staggering March of
Negligence, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 97, 122 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds.,
1998); George M. Cohen, The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1445, 1445-46 (2009).
251 Under tort doctrine, "liability is not diminished if the defendant's negligence is
slight, nor is it increased if the defendant's negligence is gross." DOBBS, LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 63, at 349 (footnote omitted). See Goudkamp, The Spurious Relation-
ship, supra note 97, at 343; Gerald J. Postema, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
LAW OF TORTS 1, 3 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). Yet, Goldberg notes in discussing
the foreseeability limitation to proximate cause, which "only crudely implements a
notion of proportionality..., courts in particular have demonstrated sensitivity to the
distorting effects of the full compensation principle by varying the scope and strin-
gency of proximate cause doctrine in accordance with the nature of the defendant's
wrongdoing." John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation:
Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2042 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
252 See, e.g., ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 192, at 154-55
(discussing mens rea). Perhaps the criminal law is more attentive to blameworthiness
in both forms here discussed because such blameworthiness is an important factor in
producing wrongful harms to the general public. The more blameworthy the crimi-
nal, the more frightening she is to the public. In principle, harms to the individual
invadee are largely requited by her private right of action irrespective of the actor's
blameworthiness beyond any required threshold. For the general public, protection
under the criminal law accounts for the harms to the public in reaction to the agent's
perceived blameworthiness. For the "fright" theory of criminality, see, e.g., NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, supra note 61, at 65-71; John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 105, 107 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969).
But there are limits to the existing criminal law's focus on the invader's blame-
worthiness. Foreseeability is an important element of aspects of blameworthiness. See
discussion infra Part VI.C. "[O]nce liability to punishment simpliciter is self-willed by
agents by virtue of a chosen interference, they become liable to state coercion di-
rected at crime control for all resulting proscribed harms no matter how remote and
unforeseeable." BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM, supra note 101, at 56. A deon-
tic retributivist would, I argue, object.
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respect others as well as treat them with respect.253 As in responsi-
bility blameworthiness, then, disrespect blameworthiness has two
prongs, attitude, Bda, and treatment, Bdt. Regarding her attitude, the
agent's subjective mental state at the time of her choice or conduct
reflects whether, or the extent to which, she is disrespectful of those
whose autonomies are curtailed. 25 4 For example, an agent may deny
another person the liberty to try out for an athletic team because she
thinks that he will get hurt (benevolent paternalism), or that his
personality would disrupt team chemistry (group welfare), or be-
cause his race is different from the rest of the team (racism). At the
high end of disrespectful attitudes are egregious mental states, such
as arrogance, disdain, malice, purpose, intention, recklessness, 255
wantonness, and gross negligence.256 At the low end are less offen-
sive mental states, such as those grounding inadvertence, minimal
negligence, 257 foreseeable double effects, non-negligent strict liabil-
ity, and those associated with excuses and justifications.258 While a
disrespectful attitude is always deontically objectionable by produc-
ing a dignitary harm at least, we may decline to adopt requital max-
ims for lesser forms of disrespect, as in some manifestations of be-
253 See, e.g., Allen Wood, Humanity as End in Itself, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS 58, 62-63 (2011). See supra text accompanying notes 195-204.
2 "There are certainly retributivists who claim that what deserves punishment
are the inner thoughts of an individual." Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A
Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 66 (1999). See DAVID BOONIN, THE
PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 96 (2008) ("motive"); SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra
note 22, at 128 ("agent's attitudes toward others").
255 See CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, supra note 29, at 80-81; DUFF, supra note 69, at
180.
256 "I believe that these three culpable mental states - purpose, knowledge, and
recklessness - all exhibit the single moral failing of insufficient concern for the inter-
ests of others." Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 154, at 828-29
(footnote omitted). The Model Penal Code enlists four kinds of culpability: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
257 Alexander doubts the culpability of inadvertence and negligence. See Alexan-
der, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, supra note 154, at 829-30.
2m For an interesting analysis of mental states, see Simons, supra note 67.
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neficent paternalism. Or we may call for minimal requitals such as
apologies. We may also forgo requitals for disrespectful mental
states when they relate to conduct found not to be wrongful, as
when an actor helps another to diet because she knows it is hellish
for him.25 9 In both of these instances, the agent's disrespectful atti-
tude diverges from her disrespectful treatment of the harmed party.
In the first case, beneficent paternalism, the agent may greatly re-
spect the invadee (the paternalism may be a product of solicitous
love towards the invadee), but does not treat him with full respect
because she denies him the freedom to choose for himself. In the
second, dieting example, the agent has a disrespectful attitude to-
wards the invadee, but she treats him with respect by agreeing to
his request to help him diet.
Even using a person as a means only to another's ends may be
done with a minimal disrespectful attitude. The conduct may be
driven by the benevolent motive to greatly increase overall social
welfare. The actor may deeply regret that anyone must suffer for
this purpose. Furthermore, denying a person the freedom to make a
particular binding choice for herself may stem from great concern
for her, even causing her net liberty (e.g., resources) to expand, such
as by declining to hold her for her consent to a one-sided contract.
The case for recognizing disrespect blameworthiness, both atti-
tude and treatment, as a separate element in some substantive and
requital maxims does not fit comfortably with existing law. 260 It is
29 "It is, to be sure, not widely recognized that it is possible for there to be cases in
which a person is blameworthy even though (she knows) she does not act wrongly."
Peter A. Graham, In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation, 121 ETHIcS 88, 94
n.14 (2010) (with citation) (using the example of a consensual, excruciating medical
procedure successfully performed with the motive not to aid the patient, but to cause
her pain).
260 Nonetheless, "[wie are used to distinguishing what a person did from why she
did it, sometimes issuing separate moral judgements about the act and its motive [as
where, for example, a person commits perjury to save a life]." Mark Timmons, Motive
and Rightness in Kant's Ethical System, in KANT'S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 255, 256
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driven here by the centrality of dignity and respect in deontic prac-
tical philosophy.
When proscribed, the relative level of the disrespect may be
measured against a baseline standard established by a substantive
or requital maxim for particular conduct, such as the intention and
conduct required for tortious battery, or the mens rea and actus re-
us for criminal battery. Below the threshold, no requital is available.
Depending on whether blameworthiness is built into the substan-
tive or requital maxims, we may declare that there was no wrongful
harm or that there is no remedial entitlement.
Because of reactive attitudes, the degree of an invader's disre-
spect, if known to the person disrespected, may affect the invadee's
physical, economic, psychic, and dignitary harms from wrongful
conduct. A person put at wrongful risk, alarmed by the invader's
purpose to do so, may limit her ventures and take measures to pro-
tect her security. Or, realizing the risk was accidental, she may feel
less insecure and take no protective measures at all. The invadee
will especially be likely to suffer greater dignitary or psychic harms
from an invasion known to be motivated by malice or purpose than
she will from a comparable invasion resulting from negligence, re-
gret, or even love.261
The identification and measurement of an invader's subjective
mental state raise obvious epistemic problems. Unless she somehow
reveals it before, during, or after her conduct, gauging a disrespect-
ful attitude in actual practice may require resort to a reasonable
(Mark Timmons ed., 2002). My analysis would bring both "separate moral judge-
ments" to bear in some plausible maxims.
261 "A harm inflicted with a serious mental state sometimes inherently inflicts a
greater harm to the victim. A victim of fraud often feels worse than a victim who has
been negligently or non-negligently misled." Simons, supra note 67, at 512 (footnote
omitted). "Emotional or psychic harm based on outrage at the offender's motive or
mental state is quite real." Supra.
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person standard.262 A reasonable person standard may also be used
for calculating dignitary harm, which is an objective standard. 263
The difference is that for discerning dignitary harm we place our
reasonable person in the shoes of the invadee, while for disrespect
blameworthiness we place her in the shoes of the invader.
Responsibility blameworthiness, Br (particularly the ignorance
factor, Br1 , foreseeability), is often an important consideration in de-
ciding whether a harm should be declared wrongful by adoption of
a substantive maxim, or whether requital for a wrongful harm is
apt. Disrespect blameworthiness, Bd, on the other hand, is infre-
quently an explicit factor in these determinations. Sometimes,
though, disrespect blameworthiness is key to the issue. Torts such
as malicious prosecution, defamation, and, arguably, the intentional
infliction of emotional distress are hornbook examples. Aimed pri-
marily at protecting against dignitary and certain psychic harms
(e.g., insult), they implicate aspects of disrespect blameworthiness.
They also show again the intertwining of types of harms and
blameworthiness.
Objective dignitary harm may diverge from subjective disre-
spect blameworthiness. A reasonable person in an invadee's posi-
tion may perceive the invader's mental state as egregious or hostile
and suffer a dignitary harm accordingly when the invader's actual
mental state is more benign. The actor may, for example, be just
attempting a bad practical joke. Or, conversely, a reasonable person
may dismiss actual hostile conduct as simply a bad practical joke.
Dignitary harm may also disconnect from psychic harm.264 An in-
vader's spite will not cause the invadee psychic harm when she is
262 "When Kant addresses the question of judging legal guilt, he necessarily limits
such judgments to considerations of a person's external behavior and that person's
empirical or psychological personality and history." SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S
MORAL THEORY, supra note 23, at 243.
263 See supra note 221.
264 For instance, the tort of assault occurs independently of the fright or fear of the
invadee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 24 cmt. b (1977).
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kept in the dark, killed, or defamed after death.265 She may not learn
of the invasion until sometime afterwards. Or, she may dismiss it as
a minor annoyance until it hits the media or social networks.266 Psy-
chic harm, but not dignitary harm, may turn on the degree of noto-
riety following the invasion. A harmed person's reactions stem
from her perceptions of the aggressor's conduct as well as her un-
derstanding of the attention the invasion garners from others.267 The
time at which psychic and dignitary harms are to be gauged, say, at
the time of the antagonist's conduct or sometime thereafter, are
among the factors that should be considered when adopting first- or
second-order maxims. To boil it down, this second form of the in-
vader's blameworthiness, disrespect blameworthiness, accounts for
the level of her disrespect for the invadee as gauged by her treat-
ment of the invadee and her subjective mental state, irrespective of
how that mental state is actually perceived or felt by the sufferer or
others identifying with her.
C. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY BLAMEWORTHINESS, BR,
AND DISRESPECT BLAMEWORTHINESS, B,
Overall blameworthiness is a combination of its two aspects, re-
sponsibility and disrespect. Heightened responsibility blamewor-
thiness may offset diminished disrespect blameworthiness, or vice
versa. We could even come up with complicated interrelationships,
265 In this case, the psychic harm to kin and kith, and the public, especially when a
public figure is the direct invadee, is affected. See supra note 223. As to whether a
person can suffer a deontic harm after her death, see supra note 222.
266 For example, the hurled epithets "meat-eater", "pork-eater", or "cow-eater"
from a person with a particular dietary norm may be intended to be disrespectful
and cause psychic harm, but cause no such harm to a person who rejects the norm or
is a stoic, happy-go-lucky, etc. But even if the conduct is not perceived by the in-
vadee as disrespectful, it may nevertheless be disrespectful under a reasonable per-
son standard, depending on the cultural and social circumstances. Once the event
becomes known gossip fodder, the invadee's reaction may radically change.
267 From the invader's perspective, these ensuing contingencies are matters of
moral luck. They are matters of luck for the invadee as well.
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as where the two prongs of responsibility blameworthiness, igno-
rance (Bri) and coercion (Brc), and the two prongs of disrespect
blameworthiness, attitude (Bda) and treatment (Bdt), are linked with
one another in a four-factor matrix. A case could be made for fur-
ther intricacies based on blameworthiness aspects of, say, the four
types of harms and other factors.
Reduced responsibility blameworthiness, as by conduct from
partial ignorance or coercion, usually implies reduced disrespect of
those put at risk, and vice versa. Producing unforeseen risks is typi-
cally not disrespectful. On the other hand, responsibility blamewor-
thiness and disrespect blameworthiness may also be largely inde-
pendent. A person may be disappointed that she does not foresee
any risk of harm to third persons by her choice to engage in reckless
conduct, because she is eager to demonstrate her superiority and
dominance of others by risky action. She is highly disrespectful but
weakly responsible for the unforeseeable harms to others that en-
sue. A person could be coerced into an action harmful to another
that she does with malicious glee, though she would not have done
the act without the coercion.
Foreseeability plays a role in both aspects of blameworthiness,
Bd and Br, including both prongs of the latter: ignorance, Bri, and
coercion, Bc. I turn first to disrespect blameworthiness, Bd. Foresee-
ability may be detached from a disrespectful attitude, Bda. Just
thinking of oneself as morally superior to others, whether or not
this attitude is manifested in conduct, violates Kant's mandate.268
Foreseeability has no role to play in this. Disrespectful treatment,
Bdt, on the other hand, requires at least a minimal foreseeability. For
example, assume an agent decides, "To test my new motorcycle, I'm
going to drive with reckless abandon on this little-known
backroad." By doing so the actor treats with disrespect only those at
risk once she could foresee that others would be put in harm's way
268 See Pallikkathayil, supra note 53, at 131-32.
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in a sufficient, probabilistic sense. Below this minimal foreseeabil-
ity, as where the backroad is on her own isolated property, a person
who is actually put at risk by the recklessness (an unintentional
trespasser, perhaps) is not treated disrespectfully. Treating others
with disrespect requires some knowledge that others are being af-
fected. Foreseeability may imply a willingness and choice to use
others as a means only. The more a wrongful harm to others is fore-
seeable to an agent, the more it seems, all else equal, that she is dis-
respectful by engaging in the conduct. 269 The disrespect holds even
when the agent rues the need to make such a choice. The doctrine of
double effect, for example, controversially proposes to justify or
excuse foreseeable harms, but it does so by declaring that the per-
sons are not harmed purposely in a strong sense of "purpose", and
circumstances allow for the harm as where, in a classic conundrum,
one chooses to undertake the wartime bombing of a munitions fac-
tory sited in a residential neighborhood. 270 In sum, foreseeability is
an important factor in disrespectful treatment.
Turning back to the other, first aspect of blameworthiness, re-
sponsibility blameworthiness, Br, foreseeability appears in both of
its prongs, ignorance and coercion. For ignorance, Bri, the role of
foreseeability sits saliently on the surface. Knowledgeable, respon-
sible choices and actions require apprehension of potential conse-
quences. For coercion, Br, we must dig beneath the surface for
sightings of foreseeability. Coercion is normally a product of exter-
nal and internal forces that are independent of attenuated foreseea-
269 See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 244, at 63;
Brudner, Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law, supra note 176, at 34.
270 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7; ALAN
DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 58-62 (1977); PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of
Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19 (1978); KAMM,
INTRICATE ETHics, supra note 22, at 21-23; SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS, supra note
22, at 8-36 ("The Illusory Appeal of Double Effect"); Thomas Nagel, War and Massa-
cre, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 55, 60-61 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985) (challenging
the doctrine).
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bility. There are exceptions. For instance, when an agent places her-
self in situations in which coercive forces may come into play, fore-
seeability may indirectly surface. If one foresees the risk of external
forces, say, an approaching storm or criminal mob, then one's moral
claims of necessity or coercion are weakened when one fails to rea-
sonably respond to the anticipated threat.271 If an agent foresees the
risk of triggering internal forces, say, the slippery slope of alcohol
consumption, her later claims of disability or internal coercion
would be similarly diminished or precluded. 272 In conclusory terms,
she assumed the risk.
Blameworthiness in its four permutations may essentially play
two, sometimes intricately interconnected, roles. First, it may estab-
lish a threshold standard for applicability of a maxim (first- or se-
cond-order). Second, it may establish a gauge by which to measure
the extent of the invasion or requital once the threshold has been
met. The reason we must cope with at least some of the intricacies
of blameworthiness is that we are deontologists. At the heart of our
concerns when adopting plausible deontic maxims is our respect for
the dignity of all persons.
271 In general, a person is legally privileged to use another's property to escape ne-
cessitous situations. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 145-48; DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 248-50. Under existing
tort law, an agent's negligence may not preclude her privilege of necessity. See
DOBBs, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 248. This privilege might be grounded on
consequentialist considerations. The imposed costs are ameliorated by the doctrine
that necessity is a partial privilege only. The agent must pay for the harm that she
causes. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). In bal-
ancing the liberty and security interests at stake in circumstances of necessity, much
can be said for a maxim that stretches the necessitous agent's liberty, even if "she
knew what she was getting into." As a partial privilege, we will make her pay some-
thing to get out of it. With respect to the impecunious, necessitous agent, this would
be troublesome, for she is judgment-proof. The criminal law is less generous than
tort law in recognizing duress or necessity as a defense. It is unavailable when the
actor recklessly or negligently places herself in duress or necessity situations. See
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(2), 3.02(2) (1962).
272 See, e.g., DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 63, at 284-85.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Autonomy is not a pre-established condition or quality that is
protected by the law and other norms. Autonomy is created, given
meaning and definition, by them. Within the framework of the cat-
egorical imperative, wide latitude is allowed for delineations of au-
tonomy space. There are many possible complete and coherent sets
of maxims that fully respect the dignity of rational, ethical beings.
In drawing boundary markers that separate one person's autonomy
space from another's, sensible people may have divergent but de-
fensible views about the proper balance between liberty and securi-
ty interests. Both material, first-order maxims and requital, second-
order maxims are involved in this balancing. The law, both private
and public, as well as other norms and cultural values, have finely
traced boundary markers over the millennia. We should not, how-
ever, assume that these markers are evolving towards a unique ide-
al. With guidance from the limits mandated by the categorical im-
perative, and history as an object lesson, each person in an individ-
ualistic regime is in a position to adopt maxims that conform to her
own, justifiable notion of the proper reach of freedom. This grants
her wide latitude. Once we find it necessary to bring the govern-
ment into the process, it also has wide latitude.
